



WISE MEN CENTER  
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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# EXPECTATIONS OF THE TURKISH SOCIETY FROM THE NEW CONSTITUTION

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REPORT NO: 36

ANKARA  
OCTOBER 2011

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REPORT NO: 36



BİLGESAM PUBLICATIONS

**Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi**  
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**Survey Applied by:** Marmara Sosyal Araştırmalar Tanıtım ve Danışmanlık Ltd.Şti.



**This study has been conducted by the Turkish Society for the Promotion and Development of the International Civil Society (STD).**







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## FOREWORD

When Turkish history is analyzed, it is seen that there are well educated wise men that stand behind the achievements. Though, the multi-dimensional development of the events and the complexity of the issues lead some wise people or intellectuals to have some difficulties in correctly perceiving the events on time and produce alternative policies. Following the improvements closely, making realistic previsions about the future and producing the right policies necessitate the gathering of wise people from various fields and who have different views, with young dynamic researchers in order to provide a synergy between them in flexible organizations.

As a well-respected think-tank organization in Turkey, the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) closely analyzes political developments both internally and abroad to determine appropriate policies for Turkey and its surrounding region. To accomplish this task, BILGESAM conducts scientific research on bilateral and multilateral relations and the security strategies of Turkey. BILGESAM also focuses on domestic problems within the realms of politics, economics, technology, environment, culture, and the center aims to provide decision-makers with practical policy recommendations that are mutually beneficial for Turkey, its neighbouring states, and other countries worldwide in which Turkey has relations.

In line with the decisions that were taken at the first Wise Men Board Meeting, BILGESAM prepares various reports on certain topics. The report **“Expectations of the Turkish Society From the New Constitution”** was prepared by BILGESAM’s Ankara office and is based on a sample survey that taken by 6,810 people. I would like to extend my thanks to BILGESAM personnel and the Turkish Society for the Promotion and Development of the International Civil Society (STD).

Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandıklı  
BILGESAM President



## INTRODUCTION

This study aims at contributing to Turkey's preparation efforts of the new constitution and reflecting Turkish society's demands and expectations from the new constitution. Likewise, BİLGESAM (the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies), which conducts activities for the public interest, intends to designate the main pillars of the new Turkish constitution in line with the public's demands. BİLGESAM also aims at presenting this report to the Turkish public and law-makers, thereby contributing to the preparation phase of the new constitution.

The problems and difficulties in front of Turkey's democratization path indicate that there are still many steps to be taken for the country's democratization process. It is clear that Turkey needs a more liberal, more democratic political atmosphere. First of all, there should be legal arrangements that will address all walks of life and that mainly deal with democratic and cultural rights for equality, justice and freedoms.

Turkey is undergoing a new process in which, through its civil will, new arrangements (which ensure a more liberal, transparent and much modern future not only for the Kurdish or Alevis populations but also for the rest of the country's citizens) will be discussed. With the latest elections in Turkey, expectations and conclusions of the new parliament and the political parties will stand as the most important dynamic of this process.

Turkey's new constitution should have all the elements of "an innovative social contract which, regardless of any difference, represents all the citizens' will to live together."

The citizens' participation in the constitution-making process is the sine qua non for them to establish a sense of belonging between themselves and the constitution they would help to create. One of the means to achieve this sense of attachment is to put forward the citizens' views through field studies. Thanks to this report a social and public service has been implemented in introducing the constitution to the citizens. Likewise, such similar studies will contribute to the representation of the constitution on a wider scale and to a greater social compromise. This study was initiated with the purposes of including people's demands within the preparation process of the new constitution. Likewise, it aimed at establishing the proper grounds on which the charter can be discussed and informing the Turkish public about the new constitution.. The study, by revealing the views and the expectations of Turkish citizens from different walks of life, aspires to present certain data that will ensure that the concepts of equality, justice and freedom underlie the constitution's system of values.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“The New Constitution” to be prepared in Turkey has to be the contract which shows the will to live with differences. The participation of subgroups of people along with those, who are in line with this social contract, in the preparation phase of the constitution, and giving them the chance of putting forward their own views, will enable the new constitution to represent the opinions of more people and attain a wide-ranging social compromise. To this end, it is the objective of the study to reveal the expectations and views of the different walks of the Turkish life.

This section of the study, under the name of “Executive Summary,” is a brief one which reveals the main results of the survey and the basic tendencies of the different walks of life. In this part, every title has been explained with one or two paragraphs.

One of the survey topics is on Turkey’s administrative system/regime regarding the preparation process of the new constitution. The first of the basic findings, in this sense, is that the current parliamentary system has been strongly supported by many subgroups in Turkey. As for the presidential system and the semi-presidential system, the support for these types of governance systems rests at just 40% among the ruling AKP (Justice and Development party) members, by whom the administrative system has been brought into question. This indicates that there is a general agreement on the parliamentary system being the system of government that accommodates all of Turkey’s diverse citizens

As for the question concerning the structure of the state, two out of every three people in general are essentially in line with the unitary structure (a state governed as one single unit in which the central government is supreme and any administrative divisions (subnational units) exercise only powers that their central government chooses to delegate.) of the state, while almost one out of every three people among the Kurds-Zazas in Turkey supports such a structure. The majority of the Kurds-Zazas (four out of every five people) are in line with “unitary state” or “administrative autonomy” that is within the unitary state structure. It should also be emphasized that almost one out of four or five people stands by the idea of “federation” among the Kurds-Zazas.

Furthermore, given the recent year (in which autonomy demands and declarations have been quite often put on the agenda), it is a remarkable fact that even among the people who voted for the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), the rate of those supporting political autonomy or federative structure remains at only 40% and the same rate is 22% among all the Kurds-Zazas. Therefore, these rates of support mean a great deal for both the parties who claim to be the representative of the Kurds and for the other Kurdish political formations. Additionally, it shows that the proposed demands in this regard are not realistic

and do not reflect the social base. The findings of the surveys stand as an important source for taking into account the rising reactions and prejudices among the Turks who live in the western provinces of Turkey.

The fact that the demand for federation among the Kurds-Zazas increases in parallel with the increase in education level shows that there is a direct relationship between the level of education and political awareness.

Within the scope of the study, the framework and preparation processes of the constitution are the second main topics. The view that there should be a “framework constitution” that specifies the fundamental tenets of the new constitution is favored in Turkey with a 50% approval rate. The same rate falls under Turkey’s general average concerning this issue among the Kurds–Zazas. This could be explained by the fact that many Kurds and Zazas have been influenced by views such as: “the rights to be granted to the Kurds during the Kurdish Opening process should be the ones that are given on the constitutional basis.” Therefore, they have certain reservations about a shorter “framework constitution.”

Moreover, the survey results show that the view that “there should be a consensus primarily on the fundamental tenets of the new constitution” has been generally supported in Turkey, and by all parts of the Turkish society in specific.

As for the view saying that the new constitution should be prepared by a conciliation commission, two out of every three people in Turkey are in line with the idea. The fact that this rate increases amongst the Kurds-Zazas and Alevis indicates that these groups have higher expectations for a general consensus regarding the issue. Additionally, the positive response to the view that “the number of members to be selected for the conciliation commission should be determined in accordance with the voting rate of the parties in Turkey’s recent elections” is about 60% on average throughout Turkey. This view is, to a large extent, supported by the members of the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which is the largest party in Turkey. However, the same view is not rather favored by those who voted for the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party).

Similarly, the view that “acceptance of the constitution should be asked to the public regardless of the rate at which the constitution passes from the parliament” is supported on average by two out of every three people throughout Turkey. This view is much higher among both the Kurds-Zazas and the Alevis and this shows that such groups are looking more for a social consensus with regard to the constitution, although they are in a minority status in numbers.

Even though there is not a consensus on the new constitution, it could be said that people are insistent on the preparation of the new constitution and are open to different solution ways, in this sense. This also clarifies the fact that there is a general desire to amend Turkey's current constitution. Findings indicate that the Kurds-Zazas are more in favor of adding certain amendments to the current constitution.

A general agreement also exists on the compliance of the new constitution with the universal law and its being neutral. Besides, demands and expectations are higher among the Kurds-Zazas and this could reveal such groups' (which are few in number) look for constitutional security. Additionally, the fact that those from different realms of society in Turkey have similarly high expectations for the universality and neutrality of the new constitution shows that people are in the quest of a constitution that is based on an individual and fundamental rights, rather than the one based on the state and ideology.

The survey results show that there is a general agreement on including the irrevocable provisions of the current Turkish constitution (such as the principles of Republicanism and secularism, and the statutes related to the Turkish flag, Turkey's national anthem and state capital Ankara) in the new constitution as well. Nevertheless, it has been also found that one out of every three people among the Turks, and two out of every three people among the Kurds-Zazas, perceive some problems in either certain or all of the irrevocable provisions of the constitution.

Within the scope of the same irrevocable provisions of the constitution, people were asked one question with three options, the two of which are: "there should not be any reference to any ethnic group including 'Turkishness' in the constitution" and "there should be reference to the other ethnic groups." The Kurds-Zazas have given positive responses to these two views, at the rate of 90%. This positive response indicates that this group of people has high expectations from the new constitution regarding this particular topic. Furthermore, these findings are quite striking in the sense that 'Turkishness' is perceived and defined by the Kurds-Zazas as something of an ethnical basis, as opposed to discourse among the Turkish people that this is not something related to ethnicity.

The other option is the view saying "there should be reference only to 'Turkishness' in the constitution." This view has been agreed by only one out of every three people among the Turks. This shows that the Turks are not rather strict in this issue. Therefore, this result could be regarded as a general agreement that may include the other ethnic groups in the constitution along with 'Turkishness.' Such an alternative, in turn, presents the chance that the concept of 'Turkishness' will no longer pose as a problem for the new constitution-making process.

The Kurds-Zazas have large demands regarding the teaching and usage of the other mother tongues alongside Turkish language in the public domain. It should also be noted that among the Turks, in general, this view is not regarded as negative and one out of every two Turkish people supports this view. Therefore, this may be the good indicator for the general consensus about the issue and for the point where the culture of democracy has reached in Turkey. At this point, to attain a general consensus, solutions could be produced for the acceptance of elective courses in the other mother tongues apart from the Turkish language, for special schooling in the mother tongue, and for the usage of these languages in the public domain.

Another title within the scope of this study is about the civil-military relations in Turkey. The Turks have, at a medium level, given positive responses to the changes (such as having the Turkish General Staff report to the Turkish Ministry of Defense) which have been recently discussed in Turkey's agenda regarding the civil-military relations and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). When it comes to the Kurds and Zazas, the rate of supporting this view becomes even higher. That high support rate among the Kurds and Zazas shows a bigger demand for the changes concerning the civil-military relations and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). At this point, it could also be concluded that the Kurds and Zazas are more discontent with the current structure of Turkey's civil-military relations, or that they are reactive to the TAF. In that vein, it should be emphasized that all parts of the Turkish society show positive inclination for the envisaged changes in the civil-military relations of Turkey. Besides, in Turkey, in general, almost half of the people are of the opinion that the civil will should be included in the appointment and promotion of the Turkish generals, whereas the other half, by some reason or another, are against the intervention of the civil will. It should also be noted that the Kurds-Zazas are more inclined to the inclusion of the civil will in the promotion and appointment processes of the generals than the Turks.

Another subject of the survey study was on the issue of the Presidency of the Religious Affairs of Turkey and other controversial topics related to religion. When the analyses are considered within this scope, nearly half of the people opt for the maintenance of the current structure of the Presidency of the Religious Affairs, while the other half is dominantly of the idea that this institution should comprise the groups of other religions apart from the Muslims.

The view that "compulsory education of religion should be removed from the curriculum" has been supported with a rate of 38% on average throughout Turkey. The same view is supported among the Turkish Alevi, at a rate of 76% and rising to 79% among the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevi. This shows that the Sunnis (Muslims) in this country are generally in favor of

the maintenance of the compulsory education of religion while the Alevis are in general against this implementation being compulsory.

Findings show that nearly half of the Turkish society is in favor of the idea that the cemevis (Alevi houses of worship) be officially accepted as religious places of worship. This result perhaps highlights the social tolerance in a Sunni-dominant Turkish society where people are conservative about keeping the education of religion as compulsory. Special attention should also be paid to the fact that the cemevis are officially accepted as places of worship with high rates among the Turkish Alevis and the Kurdish Zazaish Alevis, 90% and 99% respectively.

Moreover, survey results indicate that the Hanafi-Shafi'is (Muslims) tend to be more conservative about the education of religion. However, implementation of compulsory religion education or officially accepting the cemevis as places of worship on the basis of a large majority of people could not be approved within the context of the freedom of religion and conscious.

It has also been found that vast majority of people (82%) are generally against the total prohibition on women wearing headscarves (or hijabs) at schools. Among the Kurds, who largely have stronger traditional ties, (90%) disagreed with the prohibition on wearing headscarves at schools. The rate of those who totally oppose the wearing of headscarves during teaching hours is 18% on average. This rate rises to 37% among the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis and 57% among the Turkish Alevis. The Alevis, who show more democratic behavior than the Sunnis on many issues, act reversely in this sense. They, partially as a result of the historical background with the Sunnis, see their (Sunni) freedom as a threat, implying the rise of the conservatism.

In brief, it could be said that in Turkey, there is a general agreement on the freedom of using the headscarf. To be more specific, all realms of Turkish society, except for the Alevis, agree on the fact that women wearing headscarves should be allowed to participate, especially within state universities.

Additionally, the view that "all public officials should be allowed to use all religious symbols, including headscarves" has a 60 approval rate on average throughout Turkey. This rate rises to 70% among the Kurds-Zazas. When the rate of those saying "yes" to the view that "public officials, excluding some of them, should be allowed to use all religious symbols including headscarves" is added to the former one (all public officials should be allowed to use all religious symbols, including headscarves), it is seen that the rate of those supporting the freedom of wearing headscarves with certain restrictions imposed on it goes up to nearly



78% on average of the country. This rate falls among the Alevis and the main contention is seen between the Alevis and Sunnis, as it has been in the case of the wearing of headscarves. In that vein, the findings indicate that wearing a headscarf is perceived as a Sunni tradition and majority of the Alevi Turks and Alevi Kurds oppose the wearing of headscarves at schools and public domains.

Another topic of the survey study is related to the election threshold in Turkey. When the views are analyzed on this issue, nearly half of the Turkish people are of the opinion of maintaining the current 10% election threshold (which stipulates that a party must have at least 10% of the national vote to be represented in Parliament), while the other half is in favor of lowering or lifting that threshold. At this point, it should be noted that those that are in line with either lifting or lowering the election threshold together stand at 70%. When the sub-categories of the view that the “election threshold should be lowered” are analyzed, half of the people (50%) express that election threshold should be lowered to 5%. This rate rises to about 60% among the Kurds-Zazas. This result says that Turkey’s existing election threshold (10%) is perceived as an important problem not only among the Kurds-Zazas, but also among the Turks. As a solution, an election threshold of 5% has been suggested.

Another question of the survey asked citizens which people or institutions (President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), –the government, or the- SBJP (Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors) should be effective in electing members to the high judiciary. According to the results, the envisaged efficiency of these five people or institutions is 54-64%. The results have revealed that it has been the high judiciary organs, with a rate of 64%, which people wanted to be most effective in electing Turkey’s high judiciary members. Moreover, the option of government selecting the high judiciary board received a support rate of 54%. It should be emphasized that on average throughout Turkey, the responses to this question don’t vary much even on the basis of ethnicity.

As for the views regarding the status of Turkey’s Higher Education Board (YOK): 45% of people wanted YOK to be removed, 33% of people wanted it to be restructured, and 22% suggested that YOK maintain its current structure. While the Kurds-Zazas demand the removal of YOK in general, the Turks generally want the institution to be either restructured or maintain in its current organization.

### **As a conclusion, these could be suggested:**

It is seen that people in Turkey, to a large extent, agree on many issues (which were thought to pose problems) regarding the preparation of the new constitution. Additionally, this study enlightens people on certain issues about which Turkey experiences social frictions. It has also been found that perceptions and expectations of the different parts of the society

regarding the new constitution are not as strict and precise as the discourses of the political parties for which they voted.

Certain large differences have been seen among different groups of people with regard to the new constitution. On certain issues, the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas have strikingly differed from each other in their answers, while on some other issues, the Sunnis and Alevis have largely differed from one other. There have also been some differences on the basis of the political parties for which people voted, people's education level and similarly on whether or not they were religious. Although these differences are more apparent on certain issues, they are generally of secondary importance.

Even though the initiatives taken for fundamental rights and freedoms have been heavily supported by the Alevi citizens, the same group of people do not show the same support on the issues related to religion and the wearing of headscarves (the freedoms which are mostly demanded by the Sunnis). It should also be noted that Alevis see the developments that are related to religion and the headscarf issue as a threat of rising conservatism.

Furthermore, demands and expectations of the Kurds-Zazas and Alevis for the universality and neutrality of the new constitution have been higher than the other groups of people. This shows that these groups (which are in a minority position) look for constitutional security is higher than the others.

The study highlights the percentage of people that agree with a certain viewpoint, and to what extent (in terms of percentage). In addition, these percentage rates have been compared with each other. However, when it comes to the probable amendments on the basis fundamental rights and freedoms, the criteria here should not be these percentages or the results of a probable referendum in Turkey. It is because any decision for amendments based on the percentages or the referendum would not be in accord with the principles of justice and would mean the domination of the plurality.

Despite the differences among different parts of the Turkish society regarding the scope and the basics of the new constitution, people have high expectations on the issues related to fundamental rights and freedoms. This indicates that people in Turkey expect a constitution that is based on rights and individuals rather than a one which is state-focused and ideology-oriented.

BİLGESAM (the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies) hopes that results of this study will contribute to the new constitution's preparation phase and social reconciliation.

## COMPARISON OF THE STUDIES AND REPORTS ON TURKEY'S NEW CONSTITUTION

This section compares the results of ten (10) studies (below) that mainly focus on Turkey's new constitution. These studies were conducted by various people and institutions within Turkey during the years 2007-2011. The forthcoming pages deal with the results of the 21 different topics that are important enough to be noted within the scope of Turkey's new constitution preparation process. Each topic is shown in an individual chart. The results of the studies and the new charter have either been summarized in few sentences or quoted from the original text within quotation marks. Interpretations about the studies and their results have not been made, but have been merely juxtaposed with one another for the sake of comparison. Results of studies given within the 'Executive Summary' section also haven't been interpreted, but instead displayed for the reader to draw their own conclusions.

The studies which focus on Turkey's new constitution are as follows:

- A Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM): "Expectations of the Turkish Society From the New Constitution" September 2011, Ankara.  
<http://www.bilgesam.org/tr/images/stories/rapor/RAPOR36yenianayasadantoplumsalbeklentiler.pdf>
- Report slides of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN): "Survey Report on Turkey's New Constitution." September 2011, Ankara.  
<http://www.memursen.org.tr/haberdetay.php?fide=2402>
- Report of the Platform for Turkey's New Constitution (YAP): "General Principles for Turkey's New Constitution." May 2011, Istanbul.  
<http://www.yenianayasaplatformu.org/arastirmalar/acg-turkiye-nin-yeni-anayasasi-icin-genel-esaslar-raporu>
- Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE): "New Constitution for a Full Democratic Turkey Under No Tutelage." May 2011, Ankara.  
<http://www.sde.org.tr/Files/Reports/76486b5fbe7d7de.pdf>
- Ankara Commission's Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV): "Towards Turkey's New Constitution," April 2011, Istanbul.  
[http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD\\_OBJSTurkiyenin%20Yeni%20Anayasasina%20Dogru.pdf](http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJSTurkiyenin%20Yeni%20Anayasasina%20Dogru.pdf)
- Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD): "Series of Round Tables for Turkey's New Constitution: Five Fundamental Dimensions of the New Constitution." March 2011, Istanbul. <http://www.tusiad.org/rsc/shared/file/YENI-ANAYASA-YUVARLAK-MASA.pdf>

- Report for Turkey's New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK): "Basic Principles for a Liberal, Egalitarian, Democratic and Social Constitution." June 2009. [http://www.disk.org.tr/content\\_images/DiSKanayasa.pdf](http://www.disk.org.tr/content_images/DiSKanayasa.pdf)
- Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN): "Report for Turkey's New Constitution." July 2009, Ankara. <http://www.memursen.org.tr/upload/documnet102.pdf>
- "Constitution Draft" which was prepared under the presidency of Ergun Özbudun, 2007, Ankara. <http://www.memurlar.net/haber/87511/>
- The Union of Turkish Bar Association (TBB): "Constitution Proposal." November 2007, Ankara. [http://eski.barobirlik.org.tr/yayinlar/kitaplar/2007\\_Anayasa%20Taslagi\\_TBB.pdf](http://eski.barobirlik.org.tr/yayinlar/kitaplar/2007_Anayasa%20Taslagi_TBB.pdf)

The following are the charts which briefly mention about results of the reports on Turkey's new constitution:

Study Names	Topic: Parliamentary System and Presidency System
<b>The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)</b>	It reveals that parliamentary system of governance is supported throughout Turkey at the rate of 68.7%.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Platform for Turkey's New Constitution (YAP) (2011)</b>	It suggests that the parliament should play the key role in Turkey, whether the parliamentary system is maintained or presidential system is adopted after the enforcement of Turkey's new constitution.
<b>The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)</b>	It points out that parliamentary system is more appropriate for Turkey, although there is an emphasis on the need of certain substantial amendments to it.
<b>The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)</b>	It suggests that in the new charter, provisions and mechanism that comply with classic parliamentary system should be established.
<b>The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)</b>	It emphasizes that parliamentary system should be adopted in Turkey's new constitution.
<b>The Report for Turkey's New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)</b>	The parliamentary system is recommended.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)</b>	A great emphasis is attached to the democratic parliamentary system.
<b>The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)</b>	A parliamentary system is recommended.
<b>The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)</b>	A parliamentary system is seen as more appropriate for Turkey on the condition that the current problems within it are improved.

Study Names	Topic: Unitary Structure <sup>1</sup> , Administrative and Political Autonomy
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	It concludes that throughout Turkey, a unitary structure is favored with a 65% approval rate, while a strengthened decentralized model is favored at 28% and federative structure with 7% approval rates.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	-
The Report of the Platform for Turkey's New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	It is proposed that state should be decentralized and decisions (excluding those joint decisions that relate to the whole Turkish society) should be at the discretion of local administrations.
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	The view that a <i>"state organization should be based on the principles of localness and being close to people"</i> has been proposed.
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	It is suggested that authorities of local administrations should be increased and these administration should be involved in democratic decision-making processes.
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is stated that the <i>"unitary structure may meet Turkey's current needs if localization is increased. However, there should also be deliberation on a zonal state structure that appears as a result of the bending of the principle of unitary state."</i>
The Report for Turkey's New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	<i>"Local administrations should have a structure that improves participatory democracy and balances central authority within the unitary structure."</i>
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	-
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	'The principle of decentralization' has been taken as the basis for local administrations.
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	There is an emphasis on the unitary structure.

1 A unitary structure is a structure governed as one single unit, in which the central government is supreme and any administrative divisions (or sub-national units) exercise only powers that their central government chooses to delegate to them.

Study Names	Topic: Irrevocable Provisions of the New Constitution
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	It reveals the view saying “irrevocable provisions of Turkey’s current constitution <sup>2</sup> should be maintained in the new constitution to be prepared.” This view has a 61-72% approval rate.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	The rate of those agreeing with the view that the “new constitution should include irrevocable provisions” is at 47%.
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	The view that “ <i>the only irrevocable reference of the state structure should be human dignity</i> ” is predominantly supported.
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	The view that “ <i>there should not be any irrevocable provision in Turkey’s new constitution</i> ” is mainly supported.
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	It has been mainly suggested that the only irrevocable view of the new constitution should be that “the Turkish state is a democratic republic.”
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is proposed that the irrevocable provision of Turkey’s current constitution saying that “the Turkish state is a Republic” should be maintained.
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	It is proposed that the principles of Republic and social state should be the irrevocable provisions of the new constitution.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	-
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	Irrevocable provisions of Turkey’s 1982 constitution have been maintained.
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	Irrevocable provisions of Turkey’s 1982 constitution have been maintained.

<sup>2</sup> “Irrevocable provisions” entail: “the Turkish state is a Republic,” “the Republic of Turkey is a secular one,” “it’s language is Turkish,” “the Turkish flag is the one that is prescribed by the law,” “Turkey’s national anthem is the ‘Independence March.’”

Study Names	Topic: Conciliation Commission and Its Structure
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) (2011)	It concludes that the rate of agreement with the view that new constitution should be prepared by a conciliation commission stands at 66.2% throughout Turkey. Likewise, the view that “members for the conciliation commission should be elected on the basis of the political parties’ voting rates in Turkey’s recent general elections” receives a 59% approval rate across Turkey.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	-
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	-
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It is suggested that “ <i>all political parties receiving more than 1% rate in Turkey’s 2011 general elections should be invited to discussions within the Constitutional Committee and such application should be certainly declared to public before the upcoming general elections. Non-governmental organization should be involved in this process.</i> ”
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	-
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is proposed that a conciliation committee should be established and parties (AKP, CHP, MHP, BDP <sup>3</sup> ) in the parliament should have equal number of representatives in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	-
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	-
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	-
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	-

<sup>3</sup> AKP: Justice and Development Party, CHP: Republican People’s Party, MHP: Nationalist Movement Party, BDP: Peace and Democracy Party.



Study Names	Topic: Drafting and Holding a Referendum on the New Constitution Draft
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	The view that “before the approval of the parliament, a constitution draft should be debated by the Turkish public for a while and feedback should be taken” receives a 66% rate of approval. The view that “acceptance of the constitution should be asked to the public regardless of the rate at which the constitution passes from the parliament” is supported with the rate of 64%.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	-
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	It is suggested that the Constitutional Committee should conduct its studies in line with reports that reflect people’s views and demands from new constitution.
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It is predominantly recommended that “acceptance of the constitution that passes from the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) as a result of the negotiations and conciliation among the Turkish public and parliament should be asked to people.”
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	-
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is suggested that a “referendum should be held for the entry into force of Turkey’s new constitution regardless of the approval rate of it by the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly).”
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	It is proposed that “after TBMM’s confirmation by voting, new constitution should be submitted to people’s vote for the final word.”
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	It places utmost importance on the necessity of debate on how Turkey’s new constitution should be.
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	-
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	-

Study Names	Topic: Reference to Ideologies in Constitution
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	74% of people throughout Turkey agree that “there should not be any reference to any ideology in Turkey’s new constitution.”
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	Almost 55% of the participants in the survey are of the idea that there should not be any reference to any ideology in the new constitution.
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	-
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It is proposed that <i>“in the preamble of the constitution, any reference should not be made to any ideological preferences. But instead, the emphasis should be on such concepts as individual, freedom, the public’s will and rule of law, which all comply with the function of the constitution.”</i>
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	It is recommended that the <i>“new constitution should not make a reference to any ideology which claims that it organizes the Turkish society and tells how it should be.”</i>
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It has been mainly stated that there should not be any reference to any ideology in the new constitution. Similarly, the emphasis should not be on Kemalism but instead gratitude should be stated for the personality of Atatürk and his efforts in the process of Turkish liberation.
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	It is suggested that constitution should not attribute holiness to any person, institution or value.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	It is stated that the <i>“constitution should not include any understanding or implication of producing an official ideology of the state.”</i>
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	It states that commitment to Atatürk Nationalism and Atatürk’s principles and reforms should be taken as the basis.
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	It proposes Atatürk Nationalism and commitment to Atatürk’s principles and reforms as a basis for the constitutional draft.

Study Names	Topic: Reference to Turkishness in Constitution
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	The views that “there should not be any reference to any ethnicity, including “Turkishness, in the new constitution,” “there should only be reference to ‘Turkishness,’” and the one saying “there should be reference to ethnic groups including ‘Turkishness’” receive approval rates between the rates of 31-35%, which are quite close to each other.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	-
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	-
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It is suggested that <i>“there should not be any reference to ethnicity while defining citizenship in Turkey’s new constitution.”</i>
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	It is proposed that new constitution should not refer to any ideological, religious, ethnic or nationalist implications with the involvement of the statement “Peoples of the Republic of Turkey.”
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is stated that <i>“the concept of ‘Turkishness’ should not be placed in the description of citizenship and bond of citizenship should be defined on the basis of a constitutional relation between the state and individual.”</i>
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	It is stated that “in order to ensure that new constitution is adopted by all the Turkish citizens, civic rights should be defined without any reference to any ethnic belonging.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	It is stated that “new constitution has to find a definition of citizenship which involves all ethnic identities of the country and reveals the perception of upper identity. Likewise, it should adopt a sense of citizenship, such as ‘citizen of the Republic of Turkey,’” which provides unifying ground.
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	It maintains the concepts of ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkishness’ and defines ‘Turkishness’ as an upper identity.
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	It makes a general description of upper identity with the statement of “Turkish nation is made up of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey.”

Study Names	Topic: Education in other mother tongues (along with the Turkish) and their usage
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	The views that “there should be elective courses for education in other languages, along with Turkish, during primary and secondary education,” “it should be possible to open schools that will provide education in other mother tongues apart from the Turkish language” both receive high rate of support (about 53%) among the Turks, while the same views’ approval rates elevate to 75% among the Kurds-Zazas.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	It has been concluded that two out of every three people (2/3) have positive views about the education of the other mother tongues on the condition that medium of instruction is Turkish.
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	-
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It suggests that “everybody has the right to receive education in their mother tongue.”
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	It is proposed that, in compliance with the constitutional framework, it should be available to receive education in the unofficial languages as well and there should be private educational institutions in these languages.
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is proposed that “it could be stated in the constitution that education in the languages other than Turkish and teaching of these languages are regulated by law pursuant to the requirements of democratic society and cultural pluralism.”
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	-
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	-
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	It is envisaged that principles related to education in the languages other than Turkish are determined by law.
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	It is stated that medium of instruction of the official and private institutions is Turkish and education in other languages and basics related to learning of these languages are determined by law.

Study Names	Topic: Usage of the languages other than Turkish in the public domain
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	The view that “convenience should be provided for those receiving public service in mother tongues other than Turkish” is supported with the rate of 53% by the Turks, while the same rate increases to 80% among the Kurds-Zazas.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	-
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	-
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It is stated that “everybody has the right to receive public service in their own mother tongues.”
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	It is advised that convenience should be provided for those receiving public service in mother tongues other than Turkish and this should be stated in the constitution.
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is stated that “the principle saying that the official language of Turkey is Turkish should be maintained. Additionally, in local administrative units where the languages other than Turkish are in the majority or in a big minority position these languages should be able to be used within public services along with Turkish.”
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	-
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	-
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	-
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	-

Study Names	Topic: Civil-Military Relations
<b>The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)</b>	The views that “Turkish General Staff should report to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense,” “the Turkish Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard Command should report to the Turkish Ministry of the Interior,” “the Turkish Military High Administrative Court and the Military Court of Cassation should be removed,” and “TAF expenditures that exceed a certain limit should be subject to fiscal exploration” receives support rates between 56-67% on average. The view that civil will should be involved in the appointment and promotion of the Turkish generals receives a 52% approval rate throughout Turkey.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)</b>	The rate of agreement with the view that “there should not be differentiation between military jurisdiction and administrative/judicial jurisdiction” is 60%.
<b>The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)</b>	It suggests that Turkish military should be subject to civil will and compulsory military service, which is defined as one of the means of militarism, should be removed. Besides, it is proposed that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) should be subject to civil representation, civil participation and civil supervision in its domestic issues and decision-making process.
<b>The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)</b>	It is proposed that Turkish General Staff should report to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, the Military High Administrative Court and the Military Court of Cassation should be removed. Civil authority should play the major determinative role in the appointment of the Turkish command echelon.
<b>The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)</b>	These are stated: The Turkish General Staff should report to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, the Chief of General Staff should be appointed by the Council of

	Ministers, the Council of Ministers should be the final authority for the appointment of high-ranking officers, TAF expenditures should be subject to fiscal exploration and the Military High Administration Court and the Military Court of Cassation should be removed.
<b>The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)</b>	These are suggested: Turkish General Staff should report to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, people to be appointed to the high command echelon should be chosen among the nominees (which are designated by TAF) by Turkish civil authority, defense expenditures should be actively carried out by the court of Accounts, Military High Administration Court and Military Court of Cassation should be removed, all resolutions of the Supreme Military Council should be subject to judicial review.
<b>The Report for Turkey's New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)</b>	It is pointed out that the Turkish General Staff should report to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, the Military High Administration Court and the Military Court of Cassation should be removed.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)</b>	It attaches utmost importance to civil-military relations which comply with democratic parliamentary regime and in which it is the civilians that play the determinative role in these relations.
<b>The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)</b>	It envisages that the Turkish General Staff should report to Prime Minister.
<b>The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)</b>	It is stated that <i>"relations and scope of authority between the Ministry of National Defense and Turkish General Staff, command forces are determined by law."</i>



Study Names	Topic: Views on the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	49% of people are of the idea that the current status of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs should be maintained, while 38.6% of them believe that it should encompass all religious groups and 11.9% of them think that it should be removed.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	-
The Report of the Platform for Turkey's New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	It is proposed that the state should not provide people with religious services.
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It is suggested that the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs is removed; in the event it is maintained, it should be autonomized. Additionally, the organization of the groups, which are not making use of the services of the presidency, should be recognized as public entity.
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	It is suggested that the <i>"structure and mission of this institution and state's impartiality towards religions should be rearranged on the basis of the principle that state equally treats members of all religions, sects, believes and disbelief."</i> <i>"...in case various religious groups are organized, state should describe them as public entity."</i>
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It is suggested that the Presidency of Religious Affairs should be maintained as an institution that provides public service and restructured in a way that it represents the other religious group.
The Report for Turkey's New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	It is proposed that <i>"presidency of Religious Affairs should be organized as an organization which equally treats all beliefs."</i>
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	-
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	The Provisions of the 1982 Turkish Constitution have been basically maintained.
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	It states that <i>"Presidency of the Religious Affairs should execute its mission in compliance with the principle of secularism and the principle of equally treating the other religions and sects."</i>



Study Names	Topic: Position of the (Alevi) Cemevis
<b>The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)</b>	The agreement ate with the view that “cemevis should be accepted as the place of worship” is at 47.5% throughout Turkey. It drops to 44.6% among the Turks and increases to 60.6% among the Kurds-Zazas. The same rate of support is 90% among the Turkish Alevi and 99% among the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevi.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)</b>	It supports the view that state does not have the authority to determine which religion and which worship/place of worship are the right appropriate
<b>The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)</b>	It suggests that “since cemevis are the place of worship, convenience/privilege provided for mosques and prayer rooms should be granted to cemevis as well.
<b>The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)</b>	-
<b>The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)</b>	-
<b>The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)</b>	-
Study Names	Topic: Compulsory Religion Classes
<b>The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)</b>	38.3% of people across Turkey support to the view that “compulsory religion classes should be removed.”
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)</b>	85% of participants from throughout Turkey support impartiality of the state towards religions and say that the state should act in accordance with the demands of the society.
<b>The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New</b>	It points out that state should provide religious

<b>Constitution (YAP) (2011)</b>	education only when there is demand in this sense.
<b>The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)</b>	It highlights that education and teaching in any religion and belief, similarly education of religion and ethics should depend on the demands of people or their legal representatives.
<b>The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)</b>	It is stated that compulsory religion classes should be removed; a course under the name of “Culture of Religions” which is objective, critical and pluralist should be involved as a selective course in the public schools’ curriculum.
<b>The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)</b>	It says that <i>“the provision that course of education of religion and ethics is compulsory at primary education should not be within new constitution.”</i>
<b>The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)</b>	It emphasizes that there should not be provision on compulsory religion classes in the new constitution, and if any provision on education of religion and ethics is placed in it, it should be stated that this education shall be received upon the demand of related people or demand of their legal representatives.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)</b>	It proposes that individuals should be provided with alternative education opportunities in receiving the religion courses.
<b>The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)</b>	There have been suggestions that religious education should depend on demands of people or their legal representatives.
<b>The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)</b>	It introduces a proposal saying that religious education should be under the supervision of the state and depend on the request and permission of their legal representatives.

Study Names	Topic: The Wearing of Headscarves (Hijab) at Schools and its Usage in Public Domain
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	<p>The view that wearing of headscarves should be allowed at the university level of education receives a 49% approval rate, while the view that they should be allowed to be worn at high school and beyond receives the rate of 49%. The view that it should be allowed at primary education and beyond gets a 27% approval rate.</p> <p>The view that “the wearing of the headscarf (hijab) and the use of religious symbols should be allowed for all public officials” gets a 60% rate of support throughout Turkey.</p>
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	The view that “freedoms of people should not be restricted because of their clothing preferences, beliefs or way of life” receives a 90% support rate.
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	It proposes that state shall not make any decisions about people’s way of wearing both during their education and public domain.
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	-
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	-
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It states that “ <i>there is no justification for university students, members of parliament, academic members and public servants not to use hijabs.</i> ”
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	-
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	It supports that individuals cannot be deprived of their right to receive university education due to their manner of dress.
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	It proposes the freedom of dress at higher education institutions.
Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	-

Study Names	Topic: Legislative Immunity
<b>The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)</b>	The rate of agreement with the view that “legislative immunity should be restricted to chair immunity” is 68%.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)</b>	It states that politicians and other people of privileged positions should be subject to judicial practices.
<b>The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)</b>	It envisages that the provision on cases where a member is caught in the act of committing a crime punishable by a heavy penalty (where legislative immunity shall not apply) should be maintained in the new constitution, and disgraceful offences should not be within the scope of legislative immunity.
<b>The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)</b>	It suggests that members of parliament should be tried in a court on condition that they are not arrested.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)</b>	It opposes the reduction of the scope of legislative immunity or its total removal.
<b>The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)</b>	It suggests alternative articles which restrict legislative immunity with chair immunity.
<b>The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)</b>	It suggests that members of parliament should be released by the court pending a trial; if the crime of a member of parliament is of nature that prevents him/her from being chosen as a member, membership as such shall be cancelled.

Study Names	Topic: Election Threshold <sup>4</sup>
<b>The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)</b>	In Turkey's general population, nearly half of the people prefer the maintenance of Turkey's existing election threshold (10%) while the other half wants the decrease or removal of this threshold. Among the Kurds-Zazas, rate of those preferring the removal or a decrease of the current threshold is 70%. Throughout Turkey, almost half (54%) of those citizens believing in the necessity of reducing the election threshold state that it should instead be reduced to a 5% threshold.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Platform for Turkey's New Constitution (YAP) (2011)</b>	It proposes that the current election threshold should be reduced or increased to reasonable level as long as the parliamentary system is maintained.
<b>The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)</b>	-
<b>The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)</b>	It suggests that current election threshold (10%) should be reduced to a reasonable level like 5% and Turkey deputyship should be created.
<b>The Report for Turkey's New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)</b>	It emphasizes that election threshold of 10% is an improper application.
<b>The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)</b>	-
<b>The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)</b>	-
<b>The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)</b>	It brings forward the provision that "Turkey's election threshold shall not exceed 5%."

<sup>4</sup> A threshold detremining whether political parties can send their members to the parliament, if so, it determines the number of PMs who will join the parliamet. Current election threshold is 10% in Turkey.

Study Names	Topic: Intra-party democracy in the constitution
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) (2011)	The rate of agreement with the view that “there should be provisions ensuring intra-party democracy in the Constitution” is 67% on average throughout Turkey. -
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	It proposes precautions that ensure intra-party democracy and prevent political parties from being unaware of people.
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It suggests that the “ <i>election system should consist of indirect single member district electoral system based on majority rule.</i> ”
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It states that intra-party democracy cannot be ensured by means of legal arrangements.
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	-
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	-
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	-
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	It proposes determinative principles and says that candidate members of parliament should be, in principle, determined by the primary election.

Study Names	Topic: Views on the Higher Education Board (YOK)
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	45% of people think that YOK should be removed, 33% think that it should be restructured, while 22% of them think that its current status should be maintained throughout Turkey.
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	-
The Report of the Platform for Turkey's New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	-
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It suggests that instead of YOK, a board which ensures academic freedom and university autonomy should be established.
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	-
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It proposes that <i>"instead of the Higher Education Board, a new formation responsible for inter-university planning and coordination should be formed."</i>
The Report for Turkey's New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	It suggests that <i>"instead of YOK, a formation whose members are chosen by Interuniversity Commission and whose only mission is to ensure coordination should be established"</i> .
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	It proposes an organization which, on condition that it is not in the status of a constitutional institution, ensures inter-university coordination and extends the scientific area of freedom.
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	-
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	-

Study Names	Topic: Participation in the process of new constitution making
The Report of the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) (2011)	The view that “acceptance of the constitution should be asked to the public regardless of the rate at which the constitution passes from the parliament” is supported with the rate of 63.5% throughout Turkey
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2011)	It says that almost 70% of people are of the idea that civil society should be involved in the constitution making process (that will be executed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly).
The Report of the Platform for Turkey’s New Constitution (YAP) (2011)	It suggests that <i>“only political and legal legitimacy are not sufficient for the new constitution. People’s views should also be taken for social legacy.”</i>
The Report of the Institute Strategic Thinking (SDE) (2011)	It says that a <i>“referendum should be held on Constitution that passes from the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In this way, legitimacy of the constitution will get strengthened.”</i>
The Report of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2011)	-
The Report of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) (2011)	It states that <i>“referendum should be held on the constitution that is accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, regardless of its acceptance rate, since this will strengthen its democratic legitimacy.”</i>
The Report for Turkey’s New Constitution by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) (2009)	It is suggested that <i>“only when the constitution that is prepared with a broad participation goes beyond those who prepare it, can it constitute a document for joint identity and compromise for the whole society.”</i>
The Report of the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (MEMUR-SEN) (2009)	It emphasizes that new constitution should get its legitimacy from the national will.
The Constitution Draft by E. Özbudun (2007)	-
The Constitution Proposal by the Union of Turkish Bar Association (2007)	-



## 1. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE

This project has been initiated by BILGESAM in order to uncover the demands and expectations of the Turkish people in terms of the 'new constitution' that is scheduled to be prepared in Turkey's new legislative year (2011-2012). Within the scope of the project, BILGESAM first analyzed the constitution drafts and reports that have been recently prepared by different people and institutions. Then, the center decided on the basic topics to be discussed and the expectations from the new constitution. The main titles and questions that take place in the questionnaire have been similarly decided. After a three week study and a pilot scheme, the questionnaire form comprised of 45 questions had been finalized.

Given the fact that people in Turkey are not equally acquainted with the new constitution process, questionnaire questions have been divided into two groups. Therefore, because of this differentiation, two separate questionnaires have been prepared one of which comprises 26 questions while the other includes 45 questions in it. In the first group, 26 questions questionnaire have been asked every participant, whereas the other 19 questions have only been answered by college and university graduates. These questions reserved for only college and college students have been given in a footnote under the related chart in the report. For the implementation of the questionnaire, Turkey's Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), determined by the Turkish Statistics Institute, has been taken as the basis. As a result, from the first subdivision level-12 regions of Turkey, 16 provinces (Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Edirne, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Trabzon, Tunceli, Van, and Zonguldak) have been chosen to perform the questionnaire.

The questionnaire form was distributed by Marmara Sosyal Araştırmalar Tanıtım ve Danışmanlık Co. Ltd. in 16 provinces. Limitations for gender, ethnicity and sect were taken into account and the random sampling (in which people were talked face-to-face) was carried out in July of 2011. The contact addresses and telephone numbers of all the participants were taken in order to prove that the questionnaire was implemented. When needed, these participants were called back and the necessary feedback was gathered. In this way, the questionnaire was tested and any question causing discrepancies was omitted and not taken into account in the assessment process of the survey.

The number of the participants in the sampling exceeded the statistically required minimum number of people for a sampling. The questionnaires have been analyzed by SPSS (17.0), a statistical analysis program and during the process of data scrubbing 357 questionnaire forms which show absolute incoherence were removed. Furthermore, in order to fit the sampling with Turkey's profile in terms of ethnicity, sects and the political party for which

people voted, a certain number of questionnaires (556) were not included in the analyses. After these steps, the remaining 6,810 questionnaire forms, which even exceeded the planned number, were taken as the basis in analyzing the resultant data. The number of questionnaires is highly above Turkey's representativeness level for statistical significance. For 32% of the 6,810 people that were subject to analysis, long questionnaire forms made up of 45 questions were issued.

Data obtained from questionnaire forms which have been applied on 6,810 people were assessed by the statistical program SPSS. For the outcome analysis, the obtained data were assessed, special emphasis being paid to the shortest and most intelligible way of transferring the results to the public opinion. Finally, the results obtained were turned into a report.

Assessment charts were based on 100 scale and within the analyses, crosstab values and percent values were showed. In order to compare the views of the different social parts of the Turkish society, the analysis outcomes were given in detail in the charts and graphs on the basis of ethnicities (Turks and Kurds-Zazas), sects (Hanafi-Shafi'is and Alevis), the political parties (AKP-CHP-MHP-BDP)<sup>5</sup> voted, and education level of the participants. Within the frame of ethnicity, only Turks, Kurds, and Zazas were involved, as other ethnic groups (such as the Arabs or the Armenians) were not included in Turkey's average in this sense. Since this report is a technical one, it has been found adequate to statistically read and shortly interpret the chart values. Apart from its introduction and methodology parts, the report consists of 13 main analysis sections.

Here, one can see the frequency distribution charts which are based on ethnicities, sects and political parties voted for by the participants, which accord with Turkey's general profile.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percentage
<b>Turks</b>	5,310	78.0	79.0
<b>Kurds</b>	1,023	15.0	15.2
<b>Zazas</b>	147	2.2	2.2
<b>Arabs</b>	172	2.5	2.6
<b>Armenians</b>	11	0.2	0.2
<b>Other</b>	59	0.9	0.9
<b>Total</b>	6,722	98.7	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	88	1.3	
	6,810	100.0	

<sup>5</sup> AKP: Justice and Development Party, CHP: Republican People's Party, MHP: Nationalist Movement Party, BDP: Peace and Democracy Party.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percentage
<b>Hanafis</b>	5,420	79.6	81.3
<b>Shafi'is</b>	713	10.5	10.7
<b>Alewis</b>	420	6.2	6.3
<b>Other</b>	115	1.7	1.7
<b>Total</b>	6,668	97.9	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	142	2.1	
	6,810	100.0	

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percentage
<b>AKP*</b>	3,193	46.9	79.0
<b>CHP*</b>	1,528	22.4	15.2
<b>MHP*</b>	823	12.1	2.2
<b>BDP*</b>	444	6.5	2.6
<b>Other</b>	301	4.4	0.2
<b>Total</b>	6,289	92.3	0.9
<b>Missing</b>	6,521	1.3	100.0
	6,810	100.0	

\*AKP: Justice and Development Party, CHP: Republican People's Party, MHP: Nationalist Movement Party, BDP: Peace and Democracy Party.

## 2. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE IN TURKEY

### 2.1. The Most Appropriate Administrative System (Regime) for Turkey


Which one is most appropriate for Turkey's administrative system (regime)? (%)			
	Parliamentary System	Semi-Presidential System	Presidential System
Turks	70.4	6.3	23.3
Kurds-Zazas	56.9	9.9	33.2
Turkey's Average	68.7	6.9	24.4

Note: This question has been asked only to college and university graduates.

This question asked people about their ideas regarding the optimal administrative system (regime) for Turkey and wanted them to choose one of them. When the results are analyzed from the perspective of ethnicity, it is revealed that:

- The parliamentary system is generally supported throughout Turkey, at a 68.7% approval rate. This rate is 70.4% among the Turks, while it falls to 56.7% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- Support given to the options of presidential system and semi-presidential system remains at only 31.3% in total.
- While the support for the presidential system is 24.4% throughout Turkey, it is 23.3% among the Turks and rises to 33,2 % among the Kurds-Zazas.

That fact that the Kurds-Zaza population have generally preferred the semi-presidential and presidential system compared to the Turks could be regarded as their reaction to status quo in the country rather than the probability that they are conscious about these systems of government. . On the basis of ethnicity, it could be suggested that there is a general agreement on the maintenance of the current parliamentary system in Turkey.



Which one is most appropriate for Turkey's administrative system (regime)? (%)				
Sect		Parliamentary System	Semi-Presidential System	Presidential System
Turks	Hanafis-Shafi'is	70.4	6.4	23.6
	Alevis	90.5	2.4	7.1
Kurds-Zazas	Hanafis-Shafi'is	51.4	10.4	38.2
	Alevis	80.6	7.5	11.9

When this chart (which analyzes administrative system preferences on the basis of both ethnicity and sect), is analyzed, it is seen that:

- Support towards the parliamentary system in Turkey's general population (68.7%) does not differ much among the Hanafi-Shafi'is of Turkish origin and the Hanafi-Shafi'is of Kurdish-Zazaish origin, being 70% and 51.4% respectively.
- Unlike the Sunnis, the support rate for the parliamentary system is high among the Turkish Alevis and the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis, being 90.5% and 80.6% respectively.
- The support rate towards the presidential system is rather low among the Turkish Alevis and the Alevis of Kurdish-Zazaish origin, being 7.1% and 11.9% respectively. The support rate is much lower towards the semi-presidential system among both groups of people.
- These results show that the Alevis, who had experienced traumas in the past (both of Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins), approach the presidential and semi-presidential system with suspicion.

When Turkey's regime is analyzed from both the perspectives of sect and ethnicity combined, the biggest support for the parliamentary system comes from the Turkish Alevis, while the lowest support comes from the Hanafis-Shafi'is of Kurdish-Zazaish origins. The biggest difference in choosing Turkey's regime is seen between the Alevis of Turkish origin and Hanafis-Shafi'is of Kurds-Zazaish origin.

Which one is most appropriate for Turkey's administrative system (regime)? (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Parliamentary system	Semi- Presidential System	Presidential System
Turks	AKP	62.2	8.0	29.8
	CHP	81.9	5.3	12.8
	MHP	71.3	4.9	23.8
	BDP	81.5	7.4	11.1
Kurds- Zazas	AKP	47.2	4.6	48.1
	CHP	69.2	13.8	16.9
	BDP	63.4	9.9	26.7

When the regime preferences are analyzed from the perspectives of *ethnicity and political parties*, the following results are seen:

- The highest support for the parliamentary system among the Turks comes from the people who voted for the CHP (at 81.9%) and from those who voted for BDP (at 81.5%). The parliamentary form of government is supported by 71.3% of those who voted for the MHP, while the lowest rate is seen by those who voted for the AKP, at 62.2%.
- The highest support for the parliamentary system among the Kurds-Zazas is from those who voted for CHP and BDP, at 69.2% and 63.4% respectively. The support coming from the Kurds-Zazas, who voted for AKP, is at the same low level (47.2% ) as the rest of the Turks. In other words, although members of the AK party brought up the issue of which system is best, the support for these 2 types of government is only 40% . among the AKP members.

Within the Kurdish-Zazaish population, the number of those who both voted for the AKP and support the presidential system for Turkey is remarkably high at 48.1%, compared to the other groups and parties. In this sense, such a high rate could be explained by the fact that this issue has been brought into question by the AKP itself. However, the discourse adopted by the AKP in bringing forward the presidential system has been more effective upon the Kurdish-Zazaish population rather than that of the Turks. This could be explained by the fact that the Kurds-Zazas see the presidential system as a radical solution to their problems.

## 2.2. State Structure

On which structure should the state be based? (%)			
	Unitary Structure	Administrative Autonomy (Strengthened Decentralized Model)	Political Autonomy (Federation)
Turks	71.2	17.2	3.2
Kurds-Zazas	38.8	39.0	22.2
Turkey's Average	65.3	27.7	7.0

This question asked people their ideas about the state structure and three options were given such as “Unitary Structure,” “Administrative Autonomy,” and “Political Autonomy.” When the results are analyzed from the perspective of the *ethnicity*, it is seen that:

- In Turkey’s general population, the “Unitary Structure” option is supported at a rate of 65.3%. This rate is 71.2% among the Turks, while it falls to 38.8% among Kurds-Zazas.
- “Administrative autonomy,” which is the model for strengthened decentralization, is supported at the rate of 27.7% in Turkey’s general population. It is supported by both Turks and Kurds-Zazas, with the rates of 17.2% and 39% respectively.
- The option of a “Federation,” which can also be defined as political autonomy, is supported with the rate of 7% in Turkey’s general population, while it rises to 22.2% among the Kurds-Zazas.


These results show that the majority of the Turks (two out of every three people) are the supporters of the “Unitary Structure” system, while the majority of Kurds-Zazas (four out of every five people) choose the choices of “Unitary Structure” or “Administrative Autonomy.” It should also be noted that the “federation” demand is advocated by one out of every five Kurdish-Zazaish people.

On which structure should the state be based? (%)				
Religious Affiliation		Unitary Structure	Administrative Autonomy (Strengthened Decentralized Model)	Political Autonomy (Federation)
Turks	Hanafis-Shafi'is	72.2	24.6	3.2
	Alevis	57.9	27.6	14.5
Kurds-Zazas	Hanafis-Shafi'is	42.0	40.4	17.6
	Alevis	20.2	30.5	49.3

When this chart is analyzed from the perspective of the *ethnicity*, it is seen that:

- On average in Turkey, the support rate towards the “unitary structure” (65.3%) does not differ much from the ethnic group averages of the Turkish Hanafis-Shafi’is and the Kurdish-Zazaish Hanafis-Shafi’is in Turkey.
- Unlike the Sunnis, the rate of support towards the “unitary structure” is much lower among the Turkish Alevis and Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis, at 57.9% and 20.2% respectively.
- The option “federation” finds 3.2% support among the Turks and 22.2% among the Kurds, while it is 14.5% among the Turkish Alevis and 49.3% among the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis.

These results indicate that the rate of support for the “unitary structure” coming from the Alevis of Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins is lower than their ethnic group average, while for the “federation,” it is actually higher than their ethnic group average. It should be emphasized that it is the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis (49.3%) whose demand for “federation” is the highest one compared to the other ethnic groups. This could be perceived as a source of problem between the current state and the social groups in Turkey.





On which structure should the state be based? (%)				
Political Party Voted for in Turkey's 2011 General Elections		Unitary Structure	Administrative Autonomy (Strengthened Decentralized Model)	Political Autonomy (Federation)
Turks	AKP	71.6	25.2	3.2
	CHP	68.4	27.3	4.3
	MHP	76.2	23.5	0.3
	BDP	30.6	38.7	30.7
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	53.9	438.7	4.7
	CHP	41.5	31.0	27.6
	BDP	16.8	43.2	40.0

When the state structure preferences of the people from the perspective of *ethnicity and the political parties voted for* in 2011 general elections are analyzed, these are found out:

- Among the Turks, the highest support for the “unitary structure” comes from those who voted for MHP (76.2%), for AKP (71.6%), and for CHP (68.4%). The same rate of unitary structure support falls to 30.6% among the Turks who voted for BDP in the last Turkish general elections.
- As for the Kurds-Zazas, the support for the “unitary structure” is highest among the voters of the AKP (53.9%), followed by the voters of the CHP (41.5%). The lowest rate (16.8%) is seen among the Kurdish-Zazaish voters of the BDP.

Given the political autonomy demands and declarations by the Kurds within the last year of Turkey, the rate of voters supportive of the BDP who demand for political autonomy or a federative structure –remains at only 40%. Similarly, this rate is only 22% among the Kurds-Zazas. These are important results for both the political parties which claim to the representatives of the Kurdish people and the other Kurdish political formations. This also clarifies the fact that the demands (such as federation) that have been proposed in the name of the Kurdish people are not indeed the demands of the Kurdish people, and additionally are not realistic. Therefore, in the light of these findings, the escalating reactions and prejudices of the Turkish people who live in the western provinces of Turkey, should be analyzed.

Which structure should the state be based on? (%)				
(%)				
Education Level		Unitary Structure	Administrative Autonomy (Strengthened Decentralized Model)	Political Autonomy (Federation)
Turks	Middle School Graduate or Primary School Education	69.7	26.8	3.5
	College graduate	71.0	24.0	5.1
	University graduate	72.1	25.2	2.7
Kurds-Zazas	Middle School Graduate or Primary School Education	48.9	34.2	16.9
	College Graduate	34.2	45.6	20.1
	University graduate	33.6	38.2	28.2

Considering the state structure on the basis of the education levels of the participants, it is found that the higher the education level of the Kurds-Zazas surveyed, the higher their demand for a federation. This implies that there is a direct relation between education level and political awareness.

### 3. CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS

#### 3.1. Views On a Framework Constitution

Agreement with the following statement: “A ‘framework constitution’ that determines the fundamental tenets is appropriate for Turkey”	
Turks	%
	58.7
Kurds-Zazas	48.2
Turkey’s Average	57.2

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

This survey question asked people their ideas about “a framework constitution” which sets the fundamental tenets for the new constitution and the rate of agreement with this view has been given in 100-scale. When the results are analyzed from the perspective of the ethnicity, it is seen that:

- The general rate of support for “a framework constitution” in Turkey is at 57%.
- The rate of support for “a framework constitution” is higher among the Turks (58.7%) compared to the Kurds-Zazas (48.2%).

Many Kurds and Zazas have wanted the rights granted to them especially after the “Kurdish Opening” process to be the rights that are based on the current constitution. Therefore, considering the survey results, this factor may have made the Kurds and Zazas hesitant about “framework constitution.”

Agreement with the following statement: "A 'framework constitution' that determines the fundamental tenets is appropriate for Turkey"		
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		%
Turks	AKP	60.4
	CHP	57.9
	MHP	59.8
	BDP	41.0
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	48.5
	CHP	55.1
	BDP	44.5

When the views about "a framework constitution" are analyzed on the basis of the 2011 Turkish general elections, it is seen that:

- The views about the "framework constitution" do not show much differences among the Turks, except for those who voted for the BDP. The biggest support comes from the voters of the AKP. It falls to 41% among the Turkish voters of the BDP.
- As for the Kurds-Zazas, the rate of support for "a framework constitution" is with 55.1%, with the highest among the voters of the CHP. The lowest rate (44.5%) is seen among the Kurds-Zazas who voted for the BDP.

### 3.2. Consensus on the Fundamental Tenets of the New Constitution

Agreement with the following statement: “There should be consensus first on the Fundamental Tenets of the New Constitution”	
	%
Turks	66.4
Kurds-Zazas	70.3
Turkey’s Average	67.0

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

This survey question asked people about their views regarding the necessity of firstly forming a consensus on the fundamental tenets of the new constitution (such as “Turkish state is a republic.”, “Its national anthem is the “Independence March”. “Its capital is Ankara”...) and the rates of agreement with this view have been given in 100-scale. When the results are analyzed on the basis of the *ethnicity and sect (Hanafi- Shafii)*, it is found out that:

- In Turkey’s general population, the view that “there should be consensus first on the fundamental tenets of the new constitution” has been supported with the rate of 67%.
- The rate of supporting this view is lower among the Turks (66.4%) compared with the Kurds-Zazas (70.3%).
- Alevis of both the Turkish origin and the Kurdish-Zazaish origins have more supported this view (80.5%-79.6%) compared to the Hanafi-Shafi’is of the Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (66.1%-68.2%).

Agreement with the following statement: “There should be consensus first on the Fundamental Tenets of the New Constitution”		
Political party voted for in Turkey’s 2011 general elections		%
Turks	AKP	67.2
	CHP	62.5
	MHP	67.5
	BDP	57.6
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	71.9
	CHP	75.0
	BDP	69.5

When the view that “there should be consensus first on the Fundamental Tenets of the New Constitution” is analyzed from the perspective of the *political parties voted for* in 2011 Turkey’s general elections, it is seen that it’s the voters of the BDP (both within the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas) who have the lowest rate in this sense (57.6% - 69.5%).

Since the view that “there should be consensus first on the Fundamental Tenets of the New Constitution” does not give any explicit information about the fundamental tenets of the new constitution, everybody agrees on a common decision. It is good news for Turkey that all supporters of the political parties have positive views and have more or less the similar rates of support on this issue.

### 3.3. Views on Conciliation Commission and the Structure of the Commission

	The New Constitution should be prepared by “a Conciliation Commission” to be formed by people both within and outside of the parliament (%)	Members for the conciliation commission should be elected on the basis of the political parties’ voting rates in Turkey’s recent general elections (%)
Turks	64.8	61.6
Kurds-Zazas	73.8	44.2
Turkey’s Average	66.2	59.0

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

These two separate questions have asked the participants their views about the preparation of the new constitution by a conciliation commission and the election of the members for this commission on the basis of the political parties’ voting rates in the last general elections. The rates of agreement with these two views have been given in 100-scale. When this data are analyzed from the perspectives of *ethnicity and sects*, it is seen that:

- In Turkey’s general, the agreement rate with the view “the new constitution should be prepared by a Conciliation Commission to be formed by people both within and outside of the parliament” is 66.2%. This rate is 64.8% among the Turks and 73.8% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (70.8%-80%) is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is (64.7%-72.3%).
- The view that “members for the conciliation commission should be elected on the basis of the political parties’ voting rates in Turkey’s recent general elections” is supported with the rate of 59% in Turkey’s general population. The same rate rises to 61.6% among the Turks, while it falls to 44.2% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (47.6%-32.8%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is (61.9%-46.8%).

Political Party Voted for in Turkey's 2011 General Elections		The New Constitution should be prepared by "a Conciliation Commission" to be formed by people both within and outside of the parliament (%)	Members for the conciliation commission should be elected on the basis of the political parties' voting rates in Turkey's recent general elections (%)
Turks	AKP	66.6	65.1
	CHP	62.6	58.4
	MHP	64.1	61.8
	BDP	60.6	37.0
Kurds- Zazas	AKP	70.2	58.3
	CHP	69.9	41.8
	BDP	81.4	31.3

When the view that "the new constitution should be prepared by 'a Conciliation Commission' to be formed by people both within and outside of the parliament" is taken into consideration from the point of the political parties voted for in Turkey's general elections, it has been found that:

- Despite voting for different political parties, the Turks do not differ from each other in agreeing with this view. The highest rate is seen among the AKP voters with the rate of 66.6% while the lowest one is seen among the BDP voters (60.6%).
- The rate of support going to this view is highest among the voters of the BDP within the Kurds-Zazas (81.4%).

Additionally, when the view that "members for the conciliation commission should be elected on the basis of the political parties' voting rates in Turkey's recent general elections" is considered from the perspective of the political parties for which people voted, it is seen that:

- The rate is highest among the Turkish AKP voters (65.1%) and is the lowest among the Turkish BDP voters (37%).
- When the same view is analyzed on the basis of the Kurdish voters, the Kurdish-Zaziash BDP voters stand as the group which give the least support to this view (31.3%).



### 3.4. Drafting and Holding a Referendum on the New Constitution Draft

	There should be a debate over the constitution draft among the public opinion before it is approved by the parliament and feedback concerning the draft should be taken into consideration (%)	A referendum should be held on the new constitution regardless of the number of positive votes of the parliament on the approval of the constitution (%)
Turks	64.7	62.1
Kurds-Zazas	74.2	71.4
Turkey's Average	66.1	63.5

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

This survey question asked people about the necessity of debate over the constitution draft among the public opinion before it is approved by the parliament and necessity of submitting it to the popular vote. The rate of those agreeing with these two views has been given in 100 scale. When the results are analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity and sect*, it is found that:

- The view that “there should be a debate over the constitution draft among the public opinion before it is approved by the parliament and feedbacks concerning it should be taken” has been supported with the rate of 66.1% in Turkey’s general population. This rate falls to 64.7 among the Turks, whereas it rises to 74.2% among the Kurds-Zazas. The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (80.8%-81.9%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is. (64.3%-72.5%).
- As for the view that “A referendum should be held on the new constitution regardless of the number of positive votes of the parliament on the approval of the constitution,” it is supported with the rate of 63.5% within Turkey in general. This rate falls to 62.1% among the Turks, while it rises to 71.4% among the Kurds-Zazas. The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (73.3%-78.6%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is (61.8%-69.9%).

Political Party Voted for in Turkey's 2011 General Elections		There should be a debate over the constitution draft among the public opinion before it is approved by the parliament and feedback concerning the draft should be taken into consideration (%)	A referendum should be held on the new constitution regardless of the number of positive votes of the parliament on the approval of the constitution (%)
Turks	AKP	65.7	63.6
	CHP	61.6	59.4
	MHP	61.9	61.4
	BDP	66.3	72.0
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	68.4	67.1
	CHP	77.3	73.4
	BDP	80.0	75.6

When the view that “there should be a debate over the constitution draft among the public opinion before it is approved by the parliament and feedbacks concerning the draft should be taken into consideration” is taken into account from the perspective of the political parties voted in 2011 Turkey’s general elections, the results are the following:

- This view shows a difference between 61-66% among the Turks who voted for different political parties and as it can be seen, the difference is slight in this sense.
- The same view is supported by the AKP voters within the Kurdish-Zazaish population in Turkey with the rate of 68.4%. It increases to 77.3% among the voters of the CHP and to 80% among the voters of the BDP.

As for the second question, when the view that “a referendum should be held on the new constitution, regardless of the number of positive votes of the parliament on the approval of the constitution” is considered on the basis of the political parties voted in 2011 general elections of Turkey, the results are as follows:

- While the rate of the positive answers to this view is between 59-63% among the Turkish voters of the AKP, CHP and MHP, it rises to the 72% among the Turkish voters of the BDP.
- When the sane view is considered on the basis of the Kurdish-Zazaish voters, it is the voters of the BDP (75.6%) that get the highest support.

### 3.5. In Case a Consensus Is Not Reached on Turkey's New Constitution

In Case a Consensus Is Not Reached on the New Constitution: (%)			
	Turkey's current constitution should be maintained or amendments should be made	The issues agreed upon should be asked to people in a whole text while for the issues consensus is not reached, they should be asked to people clause-by- clause in a referendum	The new constitution should be prepared on the basis of the issues agreed upon, and the issues that are not agreed upon should be placed within the new constitution in their current version (only to be settled afterwards)
<b>Turks</b>	52.0	30.4	17.5
<b>Kurds-Zazas</b>	30.9	39.7	29.5
<b>Turkey average</b>	48.4	31.9	19.8

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

In this question, the participants have been provided with three options in case a consensus is not reached on Turkey's new constitution. When the results are analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*, it is found that:

- The view that "Turkey's current constitution should be maintained or an amendment should be made on it" gets the biggest support and the rate of support given to this view is 48.4% in Turkey's general population. The rate of support to this view given by the Turks is much higher (52%) among the Turks compared to the Kurds-Zazas (30.9%). This shows that, compared to the Turks, the Kurds have more negative views about the maintenance of Turkey's current constitution unless a consensus is reached.
- The view that "the issues agreed upon should be asked to people in a whole text while for the issues in which a consensus is not reached, they should be asked to people clause-by-clause in a referendum" has received the second highest rate among the three options (31.9%). Positive answers given to this view by the Kurds-Zazas (39.7%) is much higher than that of the Turks (30.4%).
- As for the view that "the new constitution should be prepared on the basis of the issues agreed upon, the issues that are not agreed upon should be placed in the new

constitution in their current version only to be settled afterwards.” it was the least rated among the other two options (19.8%). Positive answers were given to this view by the Kurds-Zazas (29.5%) is much higher than that of the Turks (17.5%).

Given the results of these data, even if a consensus is not reached on the new constitution, people are insistent on the preparation of the new constitution and are inclined to find ways for a solution. It should also be pointed that the willingness and demands are much higher among the Kurds-Zazas in this context. In any event, this also makes it clear that there is a general tendency towards the change of the current Turkish constitution.

In Case a Consensus Is Not Reached on the New Constitution: (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Turkey's current constitution should be maintained or amendments should be made (%)	The issues agreed upon should be asked to people in a whole text while for the issues consensus is not reached, they should be asked to people clause-by-clause in a referendum (%)	The new constitution should be prepared on the basis of the issues being agreed upon, and the issues that are not agreed upon should be placed within the new constitution in their current version (only to be settled upon afterwards) (%)
Turks	AKP	55.1	29.0	15.9
	CHP	47.0	31.2	21.9
	MHP	56.4	27.5	16.2
	BDP	25.9	33.3	40.7
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	43.0	33.6	23.4
	CHP	27.7	49.2	23.1
	BDP	26.9	41.5	31.5

When the same question is considered on the basis of the political parties voted in Turkey's 2011 general elections, the following results appear:

- Among the Turks, it have been the voters of the AKP and the MHP (55.1%-56.4%) that have given the highest support, while it have been the BDP voters among the Turks (25.9%) who have given the lowest support to the view that "Turkey's current constitution should be maintained or an amendment should be made."
- For the same view, the highest support among the Kurdish-Zazaish electorate comes from those who voted for the AKP (43%), while the voters of the CHP and BDP have given the lowest rates, at 27.7% and 26.9% respectively.
- The view that "the issues agreed upon should be asked to people in a whole text while for the issues consensus is not reached, they should be asked to people clause-by-clause in a referendum" gets the highest support from the Kurdish-Zazaish electorate, who voted for CHP (49.2%) and BDP (41.5%).

#### 4. UNIVERSAL LAW AND IMPARTIALITY IN TURKEY'S NEW CONSTITUTION

	The constitution should be in compliance with the universal maxim of law (%)	The state should be impartial towards other ethnicities, religions and social groups other than the ethnic Turkish majority (%)	The constitution should not refer to any ideology (%)
Turks	68.0	75.4	72.4
Kurds-Zazas	82.5	85.0	80.6
Turkey's Average	70.1	77.2	73.9

Note: The first question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

The first of the three questions has been asked only to university graduates, while the other two have been asked to the entire body of participants. The rates of agreement with each of the three questions have been given in 100 scale. When the results are analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity and sect*, it is seen that:

- The rate of those agreeing with the view that “the constitution should be in compliance with the universal maxim of law” (which has been asked only to the university graduates) is 70.1% in Turkey’s general population. The rate is 68% among the Turks while it is 82.5% among the Kurds-Zazas. The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (79.1%-91%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is. (67.7%-80.4%).
- The rate of those agreeing with the view that “the state should be impartial towards the other ethnicities, religions and social groups other than the Turkish ones” is 77.2% in Turkey’s general population. The same rate falls to 75.4% among the Turks while it rises to 85% among the Kurds-Zazas. The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (86.8%-96.3%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is (75%-83%).
- The rate of supporting the view that “the constitution should not refer to any ideology” is 73.9% throughout Turkey. The same rate falls to 72.4% among the Turks, while it rises to 80.6% among the Kurds-Zazas. The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both

Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (84.1%-91.2%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi'is. (72%-78,7%).

Political Party Voted for in Turkey's 2011 General Elections		The constitution should be in compliance with the universal maxim of law (%)	The state should be impartial towards the other ethnicities, religions and social groups other than the ethnic Turks (%)	The constitution should not refer to any ideology (%)
Turks	AKP	68.6	76.6	72.6
	CHP	64.1	70.8	70.8
	MHP	69.5	76.0	72.4
	BDP	70.2	72.3	75.5
Kurds- Zazas	AKP	74.1	82.1	76.7
	CHP	77.3	85.8	81.8
	MHP	70.6	55.5	62.1
	BDP	93.3	91.9	87.3


When these three views are analyzed on the basis of the political parties voted for in 2011 general elections of Turkey, the results are as follows:

- The voters of different political parties do not show significant differences in their rates of agreeing with the view that “the constitution should be in compliance with the universal maxim of law.”
- When it comes to the Kurds-Zazas, the voters of the BDP stand out with the rate of support at about 90% to the view that “the constitution should be in compliance with the universal maxim of law.” Within this context, it is seen that the voters of the BDP differ from the other Kurdish voters.

## 5. VIEWS ON THE IRREVOCABLE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION

Which of the following items should be irrevocable provisions of the new constitution? (%)

	"The Turkish state is a Republic"	"The Republic of Turkey is a secular one"	Provision of "It's language is Turkish"	The Turkish flag is the one that is prescribed by the law	Turkey's national anthem is the "Independence March"	Turkey's capital is Ankara	There should not be any irrevocable provision in Turkey's new constitution
<b>Turks</b>	74.0	67.9	78.7	79.9	77.3	57.9	10.5
<b>Kurds-Zazas</b>	39.6	33.8	35.7	39.4	37.9	28.9	41.7
<b>Turkey average</b>	67.5	61.4	70.3	71.7	69.2	52.0	16.4



This survey question asked people about their views about the maintenance of the aforementioned six of the irrevocable provisions of Turkey's 1982 Constitution in the new constitution as well, and the results of analysis have been given on a scale of 100. When the



views on the irrevocable provisions of the new constitution on the basis of the ethnicity are considered, these are revealed:

- The rate of those agreeing with the maintenance of the provision “The Turkish state is a Republic” as the irrevocable provision of the new constitution is 67.5% across Turkey, while it rises to 74% among the Turks and falls to 39.6% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The rate of those agreeing with the maintenance of the provision “the Republic of Turkey is a secular one” as the irrevocable provision of the new constitution is 61.4% in Turkey’s general population, while it rises to 67.9% among the Turks and falls to 33.8% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The rate of positive views on the maintenance of the provision “Its language is Turkish” is 70.3% in Turkey’s general survey population, while it rises to 78.7% among the Turks and falls to 35.7% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The rate of agreement with the maintenance of the provision “Turkey’s flag, the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background” as the irrevocable provision of the new constitution is 71.7% in Turkey’s general survey group while it increases to 79.7% among the Turks and drops to 39.4% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The rate of agreement with the maintenance of the provision “its national anthem is the ‘Independence March’” as the irrevocable provision of the new constitution is 69.2% in Turkey’s general population, while it rises to 77.3% among the Turks and dips to 37.9% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- As for the rate of agreement with the maintenance of the provision “its capital is Ankara” as the irrevocable provision of the new constitution, it is found that it is 52% throughout Turkey while it rises to 57.9% among the Turks and to 58.9% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The survey question also asked people their views about the third option that “there should not be any irrevocable provision in Turkey’s new constitution.” The rate of agreement with this view is 16.4% overall in Turkey, while it is 10.5% among the Turks and 41.7% among the Kurds-Zazas.

The overall assessment of these results says that:

There is a general agreement on the maintenance of the above-mentioned provisions as the irrevocable provisions of Turkey’s new constitution with the rate of 84% in Turkey’s general population, while it peaks to 90% among those who declare their ethnicities as “Turks” and drops to 58% among the Kurds and Zazas.

When the irrevocable provisions are considered individually, excluding the provision “its [Turkey’s] capital is Ankara,” the total agreement rate on the further maintenance of the irrevocable conditions (as mentioned above) in the new constitution is between 61-72% across Turkey. The agreement rate rises to 68-80% among the Turks while it falls to 34-40% among the Kurds-Zazas. In other words, two out of every three Turkish people have agree with the maintenance of the irrevocable provisions of the constitution while one out of every three people among the Kurds-Zazas opts for the maintenance of the irrevocable provisions of the constitution.

This data also sheds a light on the fact that the principles of the Republic and secularism have generally been adopted by the people of Turkey.

Additionally, it could be suggested that the relative disagreement with the maintenance of the irrevocable provisions of the constitution among the Kurdish-Zazaish population result from their dissatisfaction from and reaction to typical Turkey’s system

**Which of the following ones should be the irrevocable provisions of the new constitution? (%)**

Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		The Turkish state is a Republic	The Republic of Turkey is a secular one	Provision of "It's language is Turkish"	The Turkish flag is the one that is prescribe d by the law	Turkey's national anthem is the "Independ ence March"	Turkey's capital is Ankara	There should not be any irrevocable provision in Turkey's new constitution
Turks	AKP	69.8	61.4	78.2	81.6	78.9	56.5	11.0
	CHP	79.9	79.7	76.3	73.8	71.8	60.0	10.6
	MHP	80.6	70.7	88.0	87.9	85.3	64.7	5.5
	BDP	57.1	57.1	40.8	40.8	40.8	38.8	38.8
Kurds- Zazas	AKP	50.3	39.1	51.5	56.8	55.4	37.7	23.9
	CHP	55.6	60.1	42.5	47.7	49.7	36.6	30.7
	MHP	41.9	50.0	46.9	50.0	50.0	31.3	12.5
	BDP	21.1	17.7	11.9	11.9	9.5	14.0	72.0

When the same view is analyzed from the perspective of the political parties voted in the 2011 Turkish general elections, it is found that:

- The highest rate of support for the maintenance of the irrevocable provisions of the new constitution (except for the principle of the secularism among the Turks) comes from the MHP voters. For the principle of secularism, the highest support comes from the CHP voters.
- Among the Turks, the lowest rate of support for the maintenance of the irrevocable provisions of the constitution in Turkey's new constitution as well is given by the BDP's voters.
- It is the voters of the BDP within the Kurds-Zazas who give the lowest rate of support for the maintenance of the irrevocable provisions of the constitution in the new constitution. Among the Kurds-Zazas, those who voted for the parties other than BDP, the rate of those supporting the same view is between 40-50%. However, for the voters of the BDP in the same group, it falls to 10%.

The views on the maintenance of the irrevocable provisions in Turkey's new constitution also do not change considerably among the supporters of the political parties (excluding the BDP) within both the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas.


## 6. REFERENCE TO TURKISHNESS IN THE CONSTITUTION

With which of the following statements do you agree? (%)			
	There should not be any reference to any ethnicity, including "Turkishness," in the new constitution	There should only be reference to "Turkishness"	There should be reference to ethnic groups including "Turkishness"
<b>Turks</b>	34.8	35.0	30.1
<b>Kurds</b>	30.2	12.4	57.4
<b>Turkey's Average</b>	34.3	30.6	35.1

This question intended to find out what people think regarding the reference to any ethnicity and "Turkishness" in the new constitution, providing the participants with the three options above. When the results are analyzed on the basis of ethnicity, it is seen that:

- The view "there should be reference only to 'Turkishness'" is supported with the rate of 30% in Turkey's general population. While it is 35% among the Turks, it falls to a mere 12% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The view that "there should not be any reference to any ethnicity including 'Turkishness' in the new constitution" is favored by one out of every three people both in Turkey's general population, among the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas.
- As for the view that "there should be reference to ethnic groups including 'Turkishness,'" it is favored almost by one out of every three people both by the Turks and in Turkey's general survey group, as it has been in the former view. Nevertheless, with the rate of support 57.4% the highest support comes from the Kurds-Zazas.

Given these, it could be said that referring to other ethnic groups along with 'Turkishness' in the new constitution may prevent this subject from being one of the problems in the preparation of the new constitution.



Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		There should not be any reference to any ethnicity, including 'Turkishness,' in the new constitution	There should only be reference to 'Turkishness'	There should be reference to ethnic groups, including 'Turkishness'
Turks	AKP	36.8	32.1	31.1
	CHP	35.3	33.9	30.8
	MHP	26.3	50.5	23.2
	BDP	33.3	16.7	50.0
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	34.8	17.1	48.0
	CHP	24.3	19.1	56.6
	MHP	23.3	26.7	50.0
	BDP	26.2	3.7	70.1

When this data are considered on the basis of the political parties voted for in the 2011 Turkish general election, the results are as follows:

- The highest support to the view of “there should only be reference to ‘Turkishness’” is given by the MHP voters among the Turks (50.5%) while the lowest rate goes for the BDP voters within the same group (16.7%).
- The view that “there should be reference to ethnic groups including ‘Turkishness.’” gets the highest support from the BDP voters both within the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas, 50% and 70% respectively.

It is a remarkable finding that within the Turkish MHP voters, the rate of support for the view that “there should be reference only to ‘Turkishness’” remains only at about 50%. This shows that the MHP voters are tolerant about this issue and they are not totally against the reference to other ethnic groups, along with ‘Turkishness,’ in the new constitution.

## 7. EDUCATION IN OTHER MOTHER TONGUES ALONG WITH THE TURKISH AND THEIR USAGE

	There should be elective courses for education in other languages, along with Turkish, during primary and secondary education (%)	It should be possible to open schools that will provide education in other mother tongues apart from the Turkish language (%)	Convenience should be provided for those receiving public service in mother tongues other than Turkish (%)
<b>Turks</b>	53.0	52.7	53.3
<b>Kurds-Zazas</b>	76.1	75.1	80.3
<b>Turkey average</b>	57.2	56.8	58.3

This question aimed at finding out what people think about the education in the other languages other than the Turkish and their usage in the public domain. Likewise, rates of agreement with each of the three views have been given in 100 scale. When the results are analyzed on the basis of ethnicity, it is seen that:

- People have given positive answers to each of the above-mentioned three rights, which correspond to 56-58% on average in Turkey.
- Each of the three views get high rates of support from the Turks (between 52-53%) while this rate even gets higher among the Kurds and Zazas.

Similar rates of answers given to above three questions both among the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas indicate that people's views about the mentioned rights do not change much, despite the rights being different from each other (for instance, among the Turks, the rate of support given to each of the three views are more or less the same: 53,0%, 52.7%, and 53.3%). High correlation between the questions ( $r: 0.522/0.623$ ) show that people either support all of the three rights concerning the mother tongue, or are against each of the three views.

It is remarkable that the Turks, like the other ethnicities, do not have negative opinions about the aforesaid rights. Here, it is important to point out that both within the Turks and Turkey's general population, the vast majority of people are in line with the idea of teaching and using the languages other than Turkish as the medium of instruction or because of

another necessity. This is an important result in showing the level of democracy that Turkey has attained.

Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		There should be elective courses for education in other languages along with Turkish during primary and secondary education (%)	It should be possible to open schools that will provide education in other mother tongues apart from the Turkish language (%)	Convenience should be provided for those receiving public service in mother tongues other than Turkish (%)
Turks	AKP	54.0	54.1	52.7
	CHP	53.5	54.7	56.3
	MHP	47.0	45.4	47.6
	BDP	88.0	81.5	90.8
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	65.3	64.0	71.7
	CHP	75.2	73.3	78.8
	MHP	42.2	50.0	59.4
	BDP	92.4	90.7	93.1

When the findings concerning the use of the other languages (along with Turkish) as the medium of instruction and their usage in the public domain, the results are as follows:

- To a certain extent, the rate of support from the Turkish AKP and CHP voters (between 52%-56%) to these views are fairly high and there is no remarkable difference between these two parties in this sense.
- Relatively, the lowest rate of support comes from the MHP voters of both the Turkish and the Kurdish- Zazaish origins, while it is the voters of the BDP who have given the highest support to these three rights.

## 8. TURKISH ARMED FORCES (TAF) AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

### 8.1. Civil-Military Relations

	Turkish General Staff should report to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense (%)	The Turkish Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard Command should report to the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (%)	The Turkish Military High Administrative Court and the Military Court of Cassation should be removed (%)	TAF expenditures that exceed a certain limit should be subject to fiscal exploration (%)
Turks	56.9	58.5	53.4	64.1
Kurds-Zazas	70.5	68.4	72.0	80.5
Turkey's Average	58.9	59.9	56.1	66.5

Note: These four questions have only been asked to college and university graduates.

The four views in the chart are all about the civil-military relations in Turkey and rates of agreement with these views have been given in 100-scale. When the results are taken into account on the basis of ethnicity, it is seen that:

- The rate of agreement with the four views is between 56-66% in Turkey's average survey population. In other words, people in Turkey positively approach to the aforesaid views on civil-military relations in Turkey.
- While Turks have given positive answers to these four views (between 53%-64%), it rises to between 68%-80% among the Kurds and Zazas who demand for a bigger change in the civil-military relations of Turkey. It could be because of the fact that the Kurds-Zazas are generally disturbed by the current structure of Turkey's civil-military relations.



Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Turkish General Staff should report to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense (%)	The Turkish Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard Command should report to the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (%)	The Turkish Military High Administrative Court and the Military Court of Cassation should be removed (%)	TAF expenditures that exceed a certain limit should be subject to appropriateness test (%)
Turks	AKP	60.8	61.2	56.5	65.4
	CHP	54.6	58.3	50.8	60.5
	MHP	54.3	54.0	53.7	65.3
	BDP	53.0	45.7	71.9	71.2
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	64.4	65.4	64.4	75.5
	CHP	57.8	50.8	61.9	73.8
	MHP	61.7	54.7	62.5	60.9
	BDP	80.1	78.1	83.3	90.1

When the aforesaid results are analyzed on the basis of the political parties voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections, it is found that:

- Among the Turks, there are not considerable differences among the voters of different political parties in terms of agreeing with the above-mentioned four views. Nevertheless, voters of the AKP look more positively to the probable changes in Turkey's civil-military relations, compared to the voters of CHP and MHP. Besides, BDP voters within the Turkish ethnicity have more positive views about the last two questions, which are about the Military Court of Cassation and the appropriateness test of the TAF expenditures.
- The agreement rate among the Kurds and Zazas do not much change according to the political parties voted. However, the voters of the BDP within the same group have more positive views about the probable changes in the Turkish Armed Forces.

## 8.2. Authority Responsible for the Appointment and Promotion of the Turkish Generals


From which rank on the Turkish political will should be responsible for the appointments and promotions within TAF ? (%)			
	All of the generals should be under the authority of the Turkish civil will	Only full generals should be under the authority of the Turkish civil will	All of the generals should be under the authority of the TAF
Turks	28.0	22.3	49.6
Kurds-Zazas	43.8	17.7	38.6
Turkey average	31.0	21.3	47.7

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

This question asks people their ideas regarding from which rank on the Turkish political will should be responsible for the appointments and promotions within TAF. Three choices have been given. When the results are analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*, it is seen that:

- The view that “all the appointments and promotions of the generals should be under the authority of the TAF” has received a rate of 47.7% in Turkey’s average survey group. It is 49.6% among the Turks, while it falls to 38.6% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The other first two views, which by some way of another, include the Turkish political will in the appointment and promotion processes of the generals, have generally been supported with the rate of 52.3%. It is 50.3% among the Turks while it rises to 61.5% among the Kurds-Zazas.

With an overall look to the results: almost half of the people in Turkey generally agree with the inclusion of the Turkish political will in the appointment and promotion processes of the generals while the other half, by some reason or another, have negative views about the inclusion of the civil will. It should also be noted that the Kurds-Zazas are more inclined than the Turks to include the Turkish political will in the appointment and promotion processes of the generals within the TAF.



From which rank on the Turkish political will should be responsible for the appointments and promotions within TAF ? (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		All of the generals should be under the authority of the political will in Turkey	Only full generals should be under the authority of the Turkish political will	All of the generals should be under the authority of the TAF
Turks	AKP	41.2	25.5	33.3
	CHP	12.0	19.7	68.3
	MHP	26.0	21.7	52.3
	BDP	23.1	15.4	61.5
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	46.7	19.0	34.3
	CHP	15.4	15.4	69.2
	MHP	29.4	35.3	35.3
	BDP	56.3	15.1	28.6

When the views on the appointment and promotion processes of the generals within the TAF are considered from the perspective of the *political parties voted for* in Turkey's 2011 general elections, the results are as follows:

- Among the Turks, the highest rate for the view that "all the appointments and promotions of the generals should be under the authority of the TAF" is given by the CHP voters, while the lowest rate to the same view is given by the voters of the AKP (33.3%). The same view is supported with the rate of 61.5% by the Turkish voters of the BDP. Although such a rate may look problematic, it gets clearer when the fact that the vast majority of these groups of people are made up of Marxist and extreme leftist groups is taken into consideration. This could be regarded as a reaction to Turkey's current government as well.
- Among the Kurds-Zazas, the view that "all the appointments and promotions of the generals should be under the authority of the TAF" received the highest rate, with 69.2% comes from the CHP voters alike, while the lowest rate with 28.6% comes from the BDP voters.

## 9. TURKISH PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND PUBLIC DOMAIN


### 9.1. Views on the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs

Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (%)			
	Its current status should be maintained	It should encompass all religious groups	It should be removed
Turks	55.2	36.0	8.8
Kurds-Zazas	31.7	49.4	18.9
Turkey's Average	49.5	38.6	11.9

This survey question provides the participants with three options regarding the status of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs. When the results are analyzed on the basis of ethnicity, it is seen that:

- On average, 49.5% of people in Turkey prefer the maintenance of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs in its current status, while 38.6% of people are of the idea that it should encompass all religious groups and 11.9% of people touch on the need for its removal.
- Among the Turks, it is the view “its current status should be maintained” that has received the highest support (55.2%), while it is the view that “it should encompass all religious groups” that has come to the fore among the Kurds-Zazas (49.6%).

In conclusion, half of the people in Turkey prefer the maintenance of the current status of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs. While support also goes for the second view, the third view which is about the removal of this institution is not widely accepted by people in Turkey.



Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (%):				
Sect		Its current status should be maintained	It should encompass all religious groups	It should be removed
Turks	Hanafis-Shafi'is	56.5	35.8	7.7
	Alevi	17.3	41.4	41.4
Kurds-Zazas	Hanafis-Shafi'is	37.0	52.9	10.0
	Alevi	1.2	28.8	70.0

When these three views on the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs are analyzed on the basis of ethnicity, the following results appear:

- While the support given to the maintenance of the current status of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs is 49.5% on average in Turkey, it falls to 17% among the Turkish Alevi and to 1% among the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevi.
- The support given for the removal of this institution is 11.9% in Turkey's general population, while it elevates to 41% among the Turkish Alevi and to 70% among the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevi.

From another point of view, it could be said that there is a sharp contrast between Hanafi Kurds and Shafi'i Kurds. Especially when more than two-thirds of the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevi opt for the removal of this institution, while both the Kurdish and Turkish Hanafis agree on either the maintenance or restructuring of this institution. Regarding this issue, Turkish Alevi and the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevi substantially differ from one other.

Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Its current status should be maintained	It should encompass all religious groups	It should be removed
Turks	AKP	61.4	34.3	4.2
	CHP	38.8	41.6	19.6
	MHP	58.6	35.3	6.0
	BDP	16.3	26.5	57.1
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	48.2	48.2	3.7
	CHP	18.4	34.9	46.7
	MHP	38.7	45.2	16.1
	BDP	14.5	54.6	30.9

When the results are considered on the basis of the political parties voted for in Turkey's 2011 general election, it appears that:

- Among the Turks, the voters of the AKP and MHP mostly agree upon the maintenance of the current status of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (between 61.4%-58.6%), while the highest rate by the CHP voters goes for the view that "it should encompass all religious groups (41.6%). Additionally, among the Turkish BDP voters the dominant view is on the removal of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs.
- As for the Kurds-Zazas, the first two views ('its current status should be maintained' and 'it should encompass all religious groups') get the highest support by the AKP and MHP voters. The supporters of the CHP and BDP mostly agree upon the removal of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs.

Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (%)				
Education level		Its current status should be maintained	It should encompass all religious groups	It should be removed
Turks	Middle school graduate or primary school education	58.6	34.9	6.5
	College Graduate	59.6	32.6	7.7
	University graduate	48.0	39.6	12.4
Kurds-Zazas	Middle school graduate or primary school education	43.8	47.4	8.7
	College graduate	31.1	50.3	18.6
	University graduate	21.2	49.4	29.4

When these results are analyzed on the basis of the participants' *education level*, it is found that both within the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas, it is the university graduates that have the most negative views regarding the current status of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs.



## 9.2. Position of the Compulsory Religion Courses and (Alevi) Cemevis

	Compulsory religion classes should be removed (%)	Cemevis should be accepted as the place of worship (%)
Turks	36.0	44.6
Kurds-Zazas	48.4	60.6
Turkey's Average	38.3	47.5

This survey question asked people about their ideas regarding the removal of the compulsory religion courses and the acceptance of the Cemevis as the place of worship. The rates of agreement with both views have been given in 100 scale. When the acquired data is analyzed under the light of *ethnicity*, the following results appear:

- The rate of agreement with the view that “compulsory religion classes should be removed” is 38.3% in Turkey’s average population. It is 36% among the Turks and 48.4% among the Kurds-Zazas. The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (75.9%-95.8%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is (34.6%-40.3%).
- The rate of agreement with the view that “Cemevis should be accepted as the place of worship” is 47.5% in Turkey’s average population. It is 44.6% among the Turks and 60.6% among the Kurds-Zazas. The rate of support given by the Alevis of the both Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins (89.7%-98.5%) to this view is higher than the one given by the Hanafi-Shafi’is (43%-54%).

The results indicate that more than 60% of people are against the removal of the religion classes. This is the implication of the fact that when it comes to teaching of religion, Turkish society (Hanafis-Shafi’is) act in a more conservative manner. Additionally, nearly half of the same society welcomes the acceptance of the (Alevi) cemevis as the place of worship and this, in turn, implies the tolerance of the Turkish society.

Sect		Compulsory religion classes should be removed (%)	Cemevis should be accepted as places of worship (%)
Turks	Hanafi-Shafi’is	34.6	43.0
	Alevis	75.9	89.7
Kurds-Zazas	Hanafi-Shafi’is	40.3	54.0
	Alevis	95.8	98.5

Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Compulsory religion classes should be removed (%)	Cemevis should be accepted as places of worship (%)
Turks	AKP	30.9	39.4
	CHP	46.0	53.9
	MHP	33.8	42.1
	BDP	68.2	76.0
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	32.0	45.9
	CHP	71.0	78.9
	MHP	47.7	52.3
	BDP	64.9	74.4

When the results are considered on the basis of the political parties voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections, it is seen that:

- The view that "compulsory religion classes should be removed" is much further supported by the CHP and MHP voters of both the Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins, compared to those who voted for the AKP and MHP among the same ethnicity.
- As for the view that "cemevis should be accepted as places of worship," it has been better supported by the CHP and BDP voters of both the Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins than it has been by the AKP and MHP voters of the same roots.

### 9.3. The Wearing of Headscarves (Hijab) at Which Level of School

At which level of school education should the headscarf [hijab] and the use of other religious symbols be allowed? (%)				
	At primary education and beyond	At high school and beyond	At university	It should be prohibited for all students
Turks	25.7	22.9	33.5	17.9
Kurds-Zazas	33.9	22.4	33.4	10.3
Turkey's Average	26.8	22.1	33.4	17.7

This question aimed at finding out people's views about the wearing of headscarves [hijab] at schools and the overall use of religious symbols. The data, divided into four views, have been analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity* and the results are as follows:

- While the view that “wearing headscarves should be prohibited for all students” is supported with the rate of 17% on average in Turkey, the same rate decreases to 10% among the Kurds.
- Under the light of above-mentioned data, the view that wearing of headscarves should be allowed at least at the university level of education receives great support, at almost 82% in total.

The results show that the vast majority of people in Turkey are opposed to the complete prohibition of wearing the headscarf (hijabs) in schools. Likewise, Kurds, which are heavily of the traditional line, completely reject such a prohibition on the wearing of headscarves (hijabs).

**At which level of school education should the headscarf (hijab) and the overall use of other religious symbols be allowed?  
(%)**

Sect		At primary education and beyond	At high school and beyond	At university	It should be prohibited for all students
Turks	Hanafi-Shafi'is	26.4	23.4	33.6	16.6
	Alevis	5.6	8.0	28.4	58.0
Kurds-Zazas	Hanafi-Shafi'is	39.1	25.7	29.4	5.8
	Alevis	3.6	3.6	56.2	36.7

When the data is analyzed on the basis of ethnicity, the results are as follows:

- The view that “wearing headscarves should be prohibited for all students” is supported with the rate of 17% on Turkey’s average population, while it increases to 58% among the Turkish Alevi, to 36% among the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis.
- The view that wearing headscarves should be allowed at least at university level of education (aggregate of primary education and college education) is supported by the Hanafi-Shafi’is at rates of 50% and 65%, while it decreases to 10% among the Alevis.

Here, it is clear that Alevis of both Turkish roots and Kurdish-Zazaish roots increasingly oppose the use of headscarves at schools. Additionally, it is seen that Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis are more tolerant towards this issue than the Turkish Alevis.

At which level of school education should the headscarf (hijab) and the use of other religious symbols be allowed? (%)					
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		At primary education and beyond	At high school and beyond	At university	It should be prohibited for all students
Turks	AKP	33.6	28.7	30.7	7.0
	CHP	10.0	12.9	33.1	43.9
	MHP	24.2	24.1	35.1	16.6
	BDP	22.4	12.2	53.1	12.2
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	44.3	27.1	25.3	3.3
	CHP	9.2	9.2	45.4	36.2
	MHP	29.0	16.1	29.0	25.8
	BDP	28.1	21.8	40.8	9.3

Under the light of the chart above, it is found that it is the AKP voters both within the Kurds-Zazas and Turks who give the highest support to allowing headscarves at schools while it is the CHP voters who give the lowest rate of support, in this sense.


#### 9.4. The Wearing of the Headscarf (Hijab) and the Public Domain

The wearing of the headscarf and the use of religious symbols during public service: (%)			
	Should be allowed for all public officials	Should be allowed for certain public officials	Should be prohibited for all public officials
Turks	59.0	18.4	22.6
Kurds-Zazas	70.1	15.4	14.5
Turkey's Average	60.1	17.6	21.2

When the data in the chart is analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*, the results are as follows:

- The view that “wearing a headscarf and the use of religious symbols should be allowed for all public officials” receives 60.1% support on Turkey’s average. The same rate falls to 59% among the Turks and rises to 70.1% among the Kurds-Zazas.
- The rate of support going for the view that “wearing a headscarf and the use of religious symbols should be allowed for certain public officials” is 17% and the one going for the view that “wearing a headscarf and the use of religious symbols should be prohibited for all public officials” is 21%.

As it has been in the former view on wearing headscarves at schools, the vast majority of the Turkish society is reactive, against the ban on the wearing of headscarves at public places.



Wearing headscarf and the use of religious symbols during public service: (%)				
Sect		Should be allowed for all public officials	Should be allowed for certain public officials	Should be prohibited for all public officials
Turks	Hanafi-Shafi'is	60.3	18.4	21.3
	Alevis	17.3	19.8	63.0
Kurds-Zazas	Hanafi-Shafi'is	78.9	14.3	6.8
	Alevis	19.4	21.8	58.8

When these rates are taken into account on the sectarian basis, it is found that:

- The view that “wearing a headscarf and the use of religious symbols should be allowed for all public officials” receives 60% support on average in Turkey. The same rate falls to 17-19% among the Turkish Alevis and the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis.
- The view that “wearing a headscarf and the use of religious symbols should be prohibited for all public officials” receives 21% support in Turkey’s average population. The same rate rises to 59-63% among the Turkish Alevis and the Kurdish-Zazaish Alevis.

The results show that wearing a headscarf is perceived as a Sunni tradition and majority of the Alevi Turks and Alevi Kurds oppose the use of the headscarf at schools and in public places.

Wearing headscarf and the use of religious symbols during public service (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Should be allowed for all public officials	Should be allowed for certain public officials	Should be prohibited for all public officials
Turks	AKP	73.3	16.6	10.2
	CHP	27.7	21.2	51.1
	MHP	59.5	18.7	21.8
	BDP	51.0	16.3	32.7
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	81.1	15.2	3.7
	CHP	26.1	26.1	47.7
	MHP	41.9	45.2	12.9
	BDP	70.8	11.1	18.0

When the aforementioned rates are analyzed on the basis of the political parties voted for in the 2011 Turkish general elections, the results are as follows:

- The view that “wearing a headscarf and the use of religious symbols should be allowed for all public officials” finds the highest support from the AKP voters of both the Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins, while the lowest support is given by CHP voters.
- On the contrary, the view that “wearing a headscarf and the use of religious symbols should be prohibited for all public officials” find the lowest support within the AKP supporters, while the highest support (48-51%) comes from CHP voters.

Unlike the other three political parties, nearly half of the CHP voters are totally against the use of headscarves in public domains.




## 10. AUTHORITIES OF THE TURKISH PRESIDENT

Turkish President's Existing Authorities Should Be (%)			
	Increased	Maintained	Reduced
Turks	24.8	54.5	20.7
Kurds-Zazas	19.0	43.3	37.7
Turkey average	23.0	52.5	24.5

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

When these rates are analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*, it is found that:

- 52.5% of the people in Turkey are in line with the idea that the president's existing authorities should be maintained.
- 24.5% of people in Turkey prefer the reduction of the president's existing authorities while 23% of people emphasized the need for an increase of the president's authorities.



Turkish President's Existing Authorities Should Be (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Increased	Maintained	Reduced
Turks	AKP	33.2	53.9	12.8
	CHP	14.4	56.1	29.5
	MHP	20.5	57.8	21.7
	BDP	11.1	18.5	70.4
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	33.3	47.2	19.4
	CHP	12.5	45.3	42.2
	BDP	7.6	38.2	54.2

When the views about the existing authorities of the Turkish president are analyzed on the basis of the political parties voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections, it is generally seen that while the dominant view among the voters of the AKP, CHP and MHP is the viewpoint saying that the "Turkish president's existing authorities should be maintained," among the voters of the BDP, the view that the "Turkish president's existing authorities should be reduced" comes to the fore.

## 11. PROSECUTONS OF THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY

	Permission should be obtained for the prosecutions of the public officials (%)	Legislative immunity should be restricted to chair immunity (%)
Turks	57.6	66.7
Kurds-Zazas	57.9	74.9
Turkey's Average	57.6	68.0

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

Rates of agreement with both of the views have been given in 100 scale. When the rates above are analyzed from the perspective of *ethnicity*, the results are as follows:

- The rate of agreement with the view that “permission should be obtained for the prosecutions of the public officials” is 57,6% on average in Turkey. This rate does not show any difference on the basis of ethnicity.
- The rate of agreement with the view “legislative immunity should be restricted to chair immunity” is 68%. While it is 66.7% among the Turks, it increases to 74.9% among the Kurds-Zazas.

Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Permission should be obtained for the prosecutions of the public officials (%)	Legislative immunity should be restricted to chair immunity (%)
Turks	AKP	59.1	67.2
	CHP	58.1	64.9
	MHP	57.9	66.3
	BDP	43.8	68.0
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	58.8	69.5
	CHP	58.7	74.2
	BDP	55.7	83.7

In both of the views presented in this chart, it is evident that both the Turkish and the Kurdish-Zazaish voters do not differ from each other (except for the Kurdish-Zazaish BDP voters) in terms of the prosecutions of the public officials and legislative immunity.

## 12. REFERENDUM IMPLEMENTATONS

	Referendums should be more often applied in Turkey (%)
Turks	63.2
Kurds-Zazas	71.4
Turkey average	64.7

Rates of agreement with the view that “referendums should be more often applied in Turkey” have been analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*. Rates of agreement with this view have been given in a scale of 100.. In Turkey’s general population, the rate of agreement with this view is 64.7%, while it is 63.2 among the Turks and 71.4% among the Kurds-Zazas.

In general, the implementation of a referendum in Turkey is widely accepted and supported. On this issue, the Kurds are one step ahead of the Turks, being more inclined to the implementation of referendum.

Political party voted for in Turkey’s 2011 general elections		Referendum should be more often applied in Turkey (%)
Turks	AKP	64.2
	CHP	61.1
	MHP	62.0
	BDP	59.2
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	66.0
	CHP	67.6
	MHP	60.2
	BDP	79.4

Given the chart above, it is seen that people’s views on the implementation of a referendum in Turkey do not change according to the political parties voted.


### 13. ELECTION THRESHOLD<sup>6</sup> AND INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY

#### 13.1. Views on Turkey's Election Threshold

What should be the election threshold for Turkey? (%)			
	It should remain as 10% (the current threshold)	It should be decreased	The election threshold should be totally removed
<b>Turks</b>	55.5	36.1	8.4
<b>Kurds-Zazas</b>	30.5	48.3	21.2
<b>Turkey's Average</b>	49.6	38.8	11.6

This survey question asked people their ideas about the optimal election threshold for Turkey and the answers coming from the participants have been given in 100 scale. When the rates are analyzed on the basis of ethnicity, the results are as follows:


- In Turkey's general, nearly half of the people prefer the maintenance of Turkey's existing election threshold (10%) while the other half wants the decrease or removal of this threshold.
- Among the Turks, the rate of those supporting the maintenance of Turkey's existing election threshold (10%) is 55.5%, while it recedes to 30.5% among the Kurds-Zazas. At this point, it should be pointed out that the rate of the Kurds-Zazas who support the removal or decrease of the election threshold is 70%.



<sup>6</sup> A threshold detremining whether political parties can send their members to the parliament, if so, it determines the number of PMs who will join the parliamet. Current election threshold is 10% in Turkey.

To which rate should Turkey's election threshold be reduced? (%)			
	A 3% threshold	A 5% threshold	A 7% threshold
Turks	15.3	52.3	32.4
Kurds-Zazas	22.1	60.8	17.1
Turkey's Average	17.3	53.8	28.8

This chart analyzes the answers of those who prefer the decrease of the election threshold. When the results are analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*, in Turkey's general surveyed population, almost half of those (54%) who prefer the decrease of the election threshold believe that the election threshold should be decreased to 5%. Among the Kurds-Zazas this rate increases to 61%.



To which rate should Turkey's election threshold be reduced? (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		It should remain as 10% (current threshold)	It should be decreased	Election threshold should be totally removed
Turks	AKP	68.5	26.9	4.5
	CHP	31.9	51.5	16.6
	MHP	53.0	41.2	5.8
	BDP	32.7	28.6	38.8
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	58.3	35.2	6.6
	CHP	16.6	52.3	31.1
	MHP	40.6	56.3	3.1
	BDP	0	62.0	38.0

When the views given regarding the question “at which rate should Turkey's election threshold be reduced?” are analyzed on the basis of the political party voted for in for Turkey's 2011 general elections, it is found that:

- The highest rate of support given to the maintenance of the election threshold at 10% comes from the AKP voters and it is followed by the MHP voters both within the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas.
- Both within the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas, it is the CHP and BDP voters who give the highest rate of support to the view suggesting the decrease of the election threshold.



To which level should Turkey's election threshold be reduced? (%)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		3% threshold	5% threshold	7% threshold
Turks	AKP	11.9	48.5	39.7
	CHP	17.4	56.5	26.1
	MHP	12.1	51.4	36.4
	BDP	21.4	50.0	28.6
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	12.7	59.0	28.3
	CHP	26.6	59.5	13.9
	MHP	22.2	66.7	11.1
	BDP	29.4	60.5	10.1

When the answers given to the question “to which rate should Turkey’s election threshold be reduced?” are analyzed, the vast majority of the voters within Turkey’s four biggest political parties find the 5% election threshold level to be more appropriate.

### 13.2. Need for a Provision that will Ensure Intra-Party Democracy in the Constitution

	There should be provisions ensuring intra-party democracy in the Constitution (%)
Turks	66.1
Kurds-Zazas	72.9
Turkey's Average	67.3

Rates of agreement with the view that “there should be provisions ensuring intra-party democracy in the Constitution” have been given in 100 scale. When this view is analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity and sectarian* basis, the rate of support going for this view in Turkey’s general population is 67.3% while it is 66.1% among the Turks and 72.9% among the Kurds-Zazas.

Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		There should be provisions ensuring intra-party democracy in the Constitution (%)
Turks	AKP	66.6
	CHP	64.5
	MHP	67.1
	BDP	60.6
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	69.5
	CHP	73.6
	MHP	54.0
	BDP	77.6

Regarding the question about ensuring intra-party democracy, there aren’t any discernable differences among Turks on the basis of the political parties voted in 2011 Turkey’s general elections, there is not a considerable differentiation among the Turks. Additionally, the highest rate of agreement with this view comes from the BDP and CHP voters, at 77% and 73% respectively.


## 14. MEMBER SELECTION TO THE HIGH JUDICIARY

	The President should be involved in the member selection process	The Parliament should be involved in the member selection process	The Government should be involved in the member selection process	The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors should be involved in the member selection process	The High Judiciary Organs should be involved in the member selection process
Turks	57.8	59.9	55.6	61.6	67.1
Kurds-Zazas	50.4	62.2	44.8	45.0	48.9
Turkey's Average	56.5	60.3	53.8	58.8	64.0

Note: This question has only been asked to college and university graduates.

Concerning the member selection process to the Turkish High Judiciary, people's views on the involvement of the above-mentioned people or institutions have been taken. It includes five questions within the scale of 10. When the results are turned into 100 scale and analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*, it is seen that:

- The anticipated effectiveness of the five different people or institutions in member selection of the Turkish high judiciary is between 53-64%.
- For the member selection to the high judiciary, it have been the high judiciary organs that receive the highest rate of support (64%) while the government has been relatively least preferred (53.8%) to be effective in this process of electing members to the high judiciary.
- The results indicate that the views regarding the member selection to the Turkish High Judiciary do not show much differentiation in Turkey's general population and on the basis of ethnicity.



Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		The President should be involved in the member selection process	The Parliament should be involved in the member selection process	The Government should be involved in the member selection process	The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors should be involved in the member selection process	The High Judiciary Organs should be involved in the member selection process
Turks	AKP	68.6	69.6	66.7	61.9	64.5
	CHP	44.1	47.3	41.7	64.4	74.6
	MHP	59.8	61.3	56.9	56.7	62.0
	BDP	31.9	44.1	31.5	51.5	61.5
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	66.6	73.0	62.2	53.8	48.2
	CHP	36.3	39.0	35.1	53.7	72.0
	BDP	47.0	67.5	38.8	34.4	42.1

When the data on the member selection to the Turkish High Judiciary is analyzed on the basis of the political parties voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections, it is found that:


- The AKP voters want to see the "President", "Parliament," and "Government" in more effective roles for the selection process of members to the Turkish High Judiciary. The MHP voters come second in preferring "President," "Parliament," and "Government" as the most effective people or institutions in member selection to the Turkish High Judiciary.
- The CHP voters of both the Turkish and Kurdish-Zazaish origins want to see the "High Judiciary Organs" more effective in selecting the High Judiciary members.

## 15. VIEWS ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION BOARD (YOK)

The Higher Education Board (YOK)			
	Its existing status should be maintained	It should be restructured so that universities in Turkey become more autonomous	It should be removed
Turks	23.9	35.0	41.1
Kurds-Zazas	17.3	23.7	59.0
Turkey's Average	22.2	32.5	45.3

When this data is analyzed on the basis of *ethnicity*, it is found that:

- 45.3% of people want the Higher Education Board (YOK) to be removed while 32.5% of those surveyed want YOK to be restructured. 22% of participants want YOK to maintain its current structure.
- Among the Kurds-Zazas, the proposal for the removal of YOK receives the highest support, while among the Turks, restructuring or its maintenance in its existing status gets the highest support.



The Higher Education Board (YOK)				
Political party voted for in Turkey's 2011 general elections		Its existing status should be maintained	It should be restructured so that universities in Turkey become more autonomous	It should be removed
Turks	AKP	27.6	38.3	34.1
	CHP	18.6	27.9	53.5
	MHP	22.4	38.0	39.6
	BDP	16.7	10.4	72.9
Kurds-Zazas	AKP	29.4	29.0	41.5
	CHP	10.5	15.8	73.7
	MHP	16.1	38.7	45.2
	BDP	6.4	17.2	76.4

Both within the Turks and the Kurds-Zazas, the vast majority of the AKP and MHP voters believe that YOK should either be restructured or maintained in its current structure, while most of the CHP voters support the removal of YOK.

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Wise Strategy Journal Vol. 1, No 1, Fall 2009

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 1, No 2, Spring 2010

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 1, No 3, Fall 2010

Wise Strategy Journal Vol 2, No 4, Spring 2011

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





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Interview with Kasım Esen

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